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ABSTRACT 
 
Forum Shopping for Conflict Resolution in Modernizing Polities: A Case of Yei 
Municipality, South Sudan 
 
Student: UMBA PETER BOSCO 
 
M.A. Thesis, 2016 
 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Emre Hatipoğlu 
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This study investigates factors that influence disputants’ venue selection strategies and preferences 
in South Sudan where the role of informal dispute resolution systems has been recently 
supplemented with legal mechanisms in modernizing polities.  The study is a contribution to the 
conflict resolution literature in understating factors that motivate venue selection. Using non-
probability convenience sampling method, 288 surveys were conducted in three locations. The 
overall findings indicate that traditional courts are more preferable than modern courts for 
resolving debt cases, land grabbing, theft, child custody and fight. However, legal venues are 
preferred to resolve cases such as murder, road accidents, rape and defilement. Interestingly, both 
legal and traditional courts are used to resolve theft, adultery and elopement cases in different 
contexts. The findings also indicate that the accessibility, affordability, nature and speed of 
resolution (practicality) are the over-riding motivating factors for both modern and traditional 
courts preference followed by norms and values and lastly, venue characteristics.  
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ÖZET 
 
Modernleşen Yönetimlerde Anlaşmazlık Çözümü İçin Daha İyi Sonuç Almak: Güney 
Sudan’ın Durumu 
 
UMBA PETER BOSCO 
 
Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Haziran 2016 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr.Emre Hatipoğlu 
 
 
Bu çalışma son yıllarda enformel uyuşmazlık çözüm sistemlerinin yerini modernleşen 
yönetimlerde yasal mekanizmalara bırakan Güney Sudan’da,  uyuşmazlık içinde olan bireylerin 
mekan seçme stratejileri ve tercihlerini etkileyen etkenleri araştırmaktadır. Çalışma, uyuşmazlık 
çözümü literatüründeki yasal/modern uyuşmazlık çözümlerinin enformel mekanizmalara karşı 
tanımlama bulmacasını çözmeyi sağlayan bir denemedir. Bu bulmacaya yanıt bulabilmek için, 
takiben 4 soru sorulmuştur: (1) Hangi özel örneklerde (uyuşmazlığın tarzı) birey uyuşmazlığın 
çözümü için hangi çözüm mekanlarına başvurmaktadır? (2) Mekan seçimini sağlayan önemli 
etmenler nelerdir? (3) Hangi faktörler uyuşmazlık içinde olanlar için mekan seçiminde anlaşmazlık 
yaratır? (4) Anlaşmazlık çözüm yerinin etkililik ve yeterliğini hakkında ihtilafta olan bireylerin 
algıları nasıldır? Olasılıksız kota örneklemesi yöntemi kullanılarak, 287 lik bir anket örneklemi 3 
farklı lokasyonda (Yei Town, Pakula Quarter Council ve Mundu Boma) yapılmıştır. Bulgular 
şunları ifade etmektedir: uyuşmazlık içinde olanlar daha az belirgin meselerle yüzleştiklerinde 
enformel anlaşmazlık çözümlerine öncelik vermektedir. Ancak, aşırı durumlarda, cinayet gibi, 
yasal forumlar tercih edilmektedir. Mekan seçimi sürecindeki en önemli etmen, geleneksel 
anlaşmazlık çözümünde uzun sure çalışıp deneyim sahibi olan –şefler gibi- enformel mekanların 
daha pratik hizmet vermesidir. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background 
 
Studying venue selection for conflict resolution in transitioning and multicultural societies 
emerging from conflict has recently become a popular topic among scholars (Deng 2013; Celik & 
Shkreli 2010). Meanwhile, abundant literature on peace and conflict resolution focus particularly 
on legal dispute settlement mechanisms such as mediation, negotiation, arbitration and 
adjudication (Moore 2014; Lefler 2015). Yet little effort has been shown to the study of culturally 
cognizant dispute resolution mechanisms(Dialdin & Wall, Jr. 1999; Moore 2014; Fisher et al. 
2011; Cooley 2006). While one of the dispute settlement strategies mentioned above may often 
prove to be more effective than the other in different contexts, (for examples of various levels of 
mediation success, see inter alia (Pinto 2000; Steinberg 2000; Beriker & Kose 2012; Wall et al. 
2010),almost all of these studies that have examined this phenomenon have been confined to 
modern societies with state organizations penetrating through all echelons of society.  
 
Institutions that take the “individual” and her “interests” as their basic units of operation, often 
emanate from a modernist understanding of state institutions. In this sense, the process of dispute 
resolution is regulated by state apparatus and focuses on repairing broken relationships and 
protecting individual perpetrators rather than punishing them for crimes committed. Hence, the 
element of forgiveness, apology and reconciliation are of less importance when the state acts as 
the sole mechanism of dispute resolution. Institutions of dispute resolution, however, may not be 
as firmly entrenched in other societies. Individual-based dispute resolution approaches are often 
perceived not only as alien by members of traditional societies but, they are also resented for their 
perceived marginalization of indigenous dispute resolution practices (Deng 1999; Pinto 2000; 
Winsor & Skovdal 2008).  
 
Pinto (2000) argues that legal mechanisms of dispute resolution are perceived as alternative dispute 
resolution (ADRs)mechanisms that are largely unsuccessful in resolving cultural conflicts. This is 
because legal dispute resolution mechanisms are either incompatible with local cultures or they do 
not incorporate cultural norms and values into the process of dispute resolution.  Members of post-
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conflict societies where nongovernmental (NGOs) play an active role in conflict resolution often 
criticize legal dispute resolution processes for fear of erosion of cultures and, disruption of social 
harmony as well as the threat they pose to local authorities. More specifically, women and the 
elderly perceive legal dispute settlement processes as a curse to their marriages and threat to well-
established cultures. Hence, to understand venue selection processes in greater depth, research into 
this phenomenon is necessary.  Nevertheless, studies show that dispute resolution mechanisms that 
ignore the cultural element may lead to partial or total failure in resolving conflicts.  
 
Some of the most successful informal dispute resolution mechanisms such as Ubuntu in South 
Africa demonstrate how unimportant legal court arbitration and adjudication in the resolution of 
social and cultural disputes may be (Theresa 2014). According to Osei-hwedie's & Rankopo 
(2010),dispute resolution mechanisms that are based on cultural concepts, values and procedures 
are preferred by members of traditional societies. Such dispute settlement mechanisms are 
characterized as transparent, participatory, just and fair. Understanding local cultures and their 
related conflicts, as well as disputants’ venue preferences thus requires keen attention from conflict 
managers and scholars. An urgent response to the search for effective dispute resolution 
mechanisms, particularly in transitioning and multicultural societies, is therefore vital to enhancing 
conflict resolvers’ understanding of cultural influences, both on disputants’ venue selection 
strategies and during dispute resolution processes (Barsky 2000).  
1.2. Aim of the Study 
 
The literature on conflict resolution has been providing thorough descriptions of processes of 
endogenous dispute resolution mechanisms for some time (see Kose &Beriker 2012for Islamic 
ulema; Celik &Shkreli 2010 for reconciliatory mediation; Silva 2013 for mediations and 
mediators; and Zhuang & Chen 2015 for revival of mediation in labour disputes).The main points 
that emanate from such studies show that these mechanisms are culturally sensitive as opposed to 
legal mechanisms that snub local cultures and beliefs. An interesting assumption has been made 
that informal dispute resolution venues are chosen as alternatives to existing legal mechanisms 
(Kose & Beriker 2012; Pinto 2000). Relatively, few studies have specifically looked at why an 
individual chooses informal over formal dispute resolution mechanisms (or vice versa) in a 
transitioning society. Consequently, we have scant knowledge over the micro-foundations of the 
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usefulness of informal dispute resolution mechanisms in polities in which legal institutions 
consolidate the justice systems.  This paper aims to fill in this gap.  
1.3. Research Questions 
 
The facts that South Sudanese citizens have not entirely quit old habits of dispute settlement, and 
still shuffle between different conflict resolution venues prompts the following questions:  
 
1) In what specific instances (types of conflict) does an individual resort to a specific dispute 
resolution venue? 
2) What are the major factors affecting venue selection? 
3) Which factors influence disputants’ venue selection processes? 
4) What a disputant’s perception is regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of a particular 
venue of dispute resolution.  
 
To answer these questions, 288 samples were collected in three different localities (Yei, Mundu 
and Pakula) in South Sudan and surveys were conducted using structured questionnaire. These 
questions represent varying tribal attributes across age, gender, education, occupation, rural and 
urban settings. Responses to these questions will therefore help us to understand why and how one 
venue of dispute resolution is chosen over another. To the extent that dispute resolution scholars 
have not yet found specific and more effective dispute resolution strategies in transitioning and 
multicultural settings, third parties need to apply generic dispute resolution models that are 
sensitive to cultural concerns s so as to better meet the parties’ needs. Secondly, conflict managers 
need to develop dispute resolution models that are grounded in the disputants’ traditional norms 
and practices (Barsky 2000).   
 
1.4. Relevance of this Study 
 
The presence and efficacy of informal dispute resolution often fall outside of the purview of most 
Western-oriented dispute resolution literature. In many transitioning societies, an interesting 
phenomenon occurs: informal dispute resolution avenues (such as village chiefs, ulema, or local 
notables) often compete with legal venues (such as the judiciary or legal arbitration). Based on the 
research questions in the previous page, three streams of literature in conflict resolution research: 
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the cultural dispute resolution literature  (Wall et al. 2010; Kose& Beriker 2012; Silva 2013; Celik 
& Shkreli 2010, Conteh 2014; Belge & Blaydes 2013; Brickell 2015), the forum design and 
settlement compliance literature in anthropology (Beardsley 2010, Stasavage 2004, Mitchell et. al. 
2009, Shannon, 2009), and venue shopping discussions in the international relations field (Lefler 
2015 and Kellow 2012) were synthesized.  
 
A shared claim by the authors of these literatures is that, forum design influences settlement 
compliance, and that disputants’ cultural, practical and structural considerations also have an 
impact on forum selection. This research is timely and important for South Sudan which is 
currently undergoing judicial reforms and transformation. The Government of South Sudan(GoSS) 
and its judiciary are currently trying to assert themselves as the main authority capable of 
implementing effective justice and dispute resolution mechanisms, a phenomenon which is a 
problem widely observed in many post-conflict settings. Thus, our understanding of this 
phenomenon will enhance our knowledge on the topic under study. 
1.5. Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
Court type and the factors that cause either agreement or disagreement on a particular court type 
are the main dependent variables of the study. In addition, demographic characteristics will also 
be used to measure whether or not they have an influence on individuals’ court type selection 
processes. The independent variables include; perception of legitimacy and reputation of third 
parties, sense of justice; preservation of communal harmony; venue familiarity and compatibility; 
anticipated settlement outcomes; cost of venues and physical distance; decision control; 
transparency; distributional bias; and issue salience. The dependent variable is the 
agreement/disagreement regarding a particular venue of dispute resolution. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1.Introduction 
 
Usually, formal legal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms are contrasted on the basis of 
Western cultural norms. One basic dichotomy that marks the difference between these two sets of 
norms is the difference between individualism and collectivism. According to Triandis & Gelfand 
(1998), the culture orientation scale (COS) measures whether or not a society is more traditional 
or modern in terms of their cultures. Understanding a society’s culture is key to getting in-depth 
information about disputants and third parties vis-à-vis dispute resolution processes.  
 
Dialdin & Wall, Jr. (1999) observe that different cultural groups establish different institutions that 
formalize their values, behavioral norms, meanings and symbols. As such, societies that value 
harmony and cooperation set up dispute resolution processes that preserve harmony and vise-versa. 
Scholars such as Hofstede (1991), Abu-Nimer (2001) and Rogers & Hart (2002) also argue that 
members of traditional societies feel safer, more secure and more protected in their in-groups than 
in isolation. An in-group refers to a collective belonging to, and sharing of the same values and 
norms. Similarly, individuals who deviate from the standard prescriptions of an in-group are 
considered as out-group members. While conflict is largely viewed as an inevitable phenomenon 
in modern democratic settings, traditionalists view it as a costly and destructive act. Thus, there 
resolution warrants different strategies. 
 
Another important element in conflict resolution is restorative justice. Restorative justice system 
focuses on re-building broken relationships, empowering and addressing disputants’ interests 
(Kose & Beriker 2012; Pinto 2000; Dialdin & Wall, Jr. 1999). Disputants restart fresh relationships 
through a process called “hozhooji naat' aanii”meaning “now that we have done all these things, 
we are back in good relations.” The process of restoring relationships, or purification and healing 
is often facilitated by religious leaders who use words and symbols to enhance the reconciliation 
process.  
 
Moreover, legal mechanisms such as mediation, arbitration and adjudication offer protective 
measures to both victims and perpetrators. Because of threats and intimidation of weak victims, 
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courts devise mechanisms and laws that deter perpetrators from threatening or inflicting more harm 
against victims (Travis 1998). The cooperation of victims in this process is crucial so as to provide 
substantial information to court officials to be able to effectively respond to cases of intimidation. 
Where victims are reluctant to cooperate and fail to provide the required information, or fail to 
testify evidence that a perpetrator is guilty, courts become unable to prevent conflicts from 
recurring.   
2.2.Definition of Key Concepts 
 
Traditional versus modern societies 
 
Based on different cultures, locations and unequal development patterns in the research sites, a 
traditional society refers to a setting characterized by collectivist cultures whereas a modern 
society is a setting characterized by democratic values and individualistic tendencies (Hofstede 
1991; Triandis 2000). While applying these terms in this paper, members of traditional societies 
are portrayed as people who admire interdependence, group progress and social harmony whereas 
those in modern societies prefer personal gain, self-reliance and progress (Triandis & Gelfand 
1998; Triandis 2000; Hofstede 1991). Modernists perceive conflict as inevitable and care less 
about social harmony while traditionalists are risk averse because of the uncertainties associated 
with dispute outcomes. 
 
Mediation  
 
Mediation in this paper implies intervention in a dispute by village chiefs, respected individuals 
and legally trained mediators to assist disputants in resolving their disagreements through 
persuasion, compromise and concession. Mediators facilitate communication between two or more 
parties to a conflict but have no authority to impose their own decisions and agreements on the 
parties. The mediation process is voluntary thus, allowing conflict parties to have control and 
influence over the process (Moore 2014; Bercovitch 1991; Fisher et al. 2011).  
 
Legal versus informal dispute resolution mechanisms 
 
In this paper, legal dispute resolution mechanisms refer to formal conflict resolution practices such 
as mediation, negotiation, court arbitration and adjudication that are administered by trained 
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professionals capable of helping disputants agree to, and sign legally binding and enforceable 
settlements. On the other hand, informal dispute resolution mechanisms (also called alternative 
dispute resolution, or ADR) refer to venues where customary laws are applied in the resolution of 
disputes. In these venues, village chiefs, religious leaders, elders, and other notable community 
leaders act as informal third parties. In exercising their duties, these informal third parties infer 
cultural norms and beliefs in order to help disputants understand why it is important to resolve 
their disputes. Henrysson et al. (2009) noted that customary laws are most often applied in rural 
areas to resolve civil conflicts such as marriage, inheritance disagreements and, commonly used 
to resolve criminal offences such as murder and robbery. 
2.3.Venue Selection Literature 
 
Globalization and modernization have massively increased contact among members of different 
societies, particularly in the Third World, and the application of multiple dispute resolution 
mechanisms has become problematic. A key factor that hinders effective implementation of rule 
of law in post-conflict contexts is the continued and simultaneous utilization of alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms alongside legal mechanisms (Dahal & Bhatta 2008). Dahal & Bhatta also 
noted that there is rapid erosion of informal dispute resolution mechanisms in post-conflict 
contexts due to the adoption of legal constitutional mechanisms of dispute resolution. Thus, the 
major challenge faced by post-conflict societies is simultaneously applying the informal and legal 
dispute resolution mechanisms without alienating either. Relying on three streams of literatures on 
conflict resolution, I would like to offer a schematic organization of the factors influencing venue 
selection.  
 
First, the cultural dispute resolution literature maintains that (1) perceptions of the legitimacy and 
reputation of third parties, sense of justice and fairness, and preservation of communal harmony 
influence decision-making for dispute resolution venues (Wall & Beriker 2010; Kose & Beriker 
2012; Celik & Shkreli 2010; Silva 2013; Dialdin & Wall, Jr. 1999). Similarly, international 
relations literature maintains that (2) forum design/nature allowing for decision control and 
transparency plays an important role in venue selection for resolving salient issues where 
compliance is key (Stasavage 2004; Lefler 2015; Kellow 2012; Gent & Shannon 2011).According 
to the anthropological literature, (3) anticipated settlement outcomes, cost of venues and physical 
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distance influence decision-making for dispute resolution venues(Deng 1999; Pinto 2000; 
Steinberg 2000; Barsky 2000; Conteh 2014, Kim et al. 1993, and De Juan et al. 2015). 
2.3.1. Cultural Literature on Dispute Resolution 
 
Research has shown that informal venues of conflict resolution such as village chiefs, elders, and 
religious leaders are more preferred to modern courts in traditional societies. The motivation for 
preference of informal mechanisms is based on third parties’ reputation and knowledge of 
resolving local disputes (Kose & Beriker 2012; Wall & Beriker 2010; Silva 2013; Celik & Shkreli 
2010; Shea 2016).Since informal conflict resolvers wield moral authority and sense of spiritual 
responsibility, disputants tend to trust them and respect their decisions. Informal mediators are 
further perceived as less threatening and capable of resolving contentious issues peacefully and 
building trust between disputants. They also favor moderate over extremist views as a way of de-
escalating conflict. For example, Abraham’s decision to choose neither “right” nor “left” during 
the conflict over grazing land with Lot depicts his willingness to avoid violent conflict and promote 
peace (see Genesis 13:5-7).  
 
Aaron’s1 decision to accept a popular demand to produce an idol also helped to suppress conflict, 
and facilitate compromise and reconciliation. As such, informal dispute resolution is concerned 
with societal harmony and peace rather than individual rights and well-being (Henrysson et al. 
2009). Yet, the desire for social order and stability by members of traditional societies plays an 
important role in venue selection. Informal conflict resolvers in traditional societies therefore 
pursue consensus and compromise in order to restore societal order and stability. They do this by 
urging disputants to concede rather than sticking to irreconcilable interests and solutions that are 
difficult to achieve.  
 
Coercive dispute resolution mechanisms are resented by members of traditional societies for their 
negative role in disrupting established order and peace. In the Jewish culture in Israel, in South 
Korea during Kwon Kun’s and Chong Tojon’s eras respectively from 1310 to 1392 and from 1342 
to 1398, in Eastern Turkey before the birth of the Turkish Republic in 1923, and in Northern 
Albania in 1990s, reconciliation  through persuasion was the ultimate goal of dispute resolution. 
                                                          
1 Aaron is a Jewish High Priest during the Golden Calf incident in Israel (1457-1504) during Moses’ rule in Egypt. 
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According to Dialdin & Wall, Jr. (1999), disputants’ compliance and cooperation rates were lower 
in South Korea than in Israel. This is because South Korean mediators had no official powerthat 
the Israeli rabbis possess. It is also important to note that Northern Albanians, Jewish and Eastern 
Turks were bound by their religious beliefs in dispute resolution (Kose & Beriker 2012; Celik & 
Shkreli 2010; Steinberg 2000). Thus, validating the argument that informal mechanisms are 
capable of resolving disputes peacefully through consensus and compromise.  
 
Most religious people in the above mentioned societies and communities believe that forgiveness 
and reconciliation are important aspects of dispute resolution. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, truce, 
remorse, forgiveness, and repentance play a pivotal role in reinforcing disputants’ commitment to 
preservation of lives and property within tribes (Benson & Siddiqui 2014). Thus, incidences of 
dispute recurrence are minimal in such societies allowing for peaceful societal co-existence to 
prevail. 
 
Mac Ginty (2014)and Celik & Shkreli (2010) also argue that some societal norms and values 
dictate against individual behavior that endangers societal peace and harmony. In addition, dispute 
resolution strategies that escalate conflict and increase uncertainty are highly discouraged by 
members of traditional societies. Celik & Shkreli'sstudy in Northern Albania also indicates that 
although disputants trust legal agencies, they eventually prefer informal venues. The study also 
shows that Northern Albanians view informal venues as more reliable for restoring broken 
relationships and facilitating reconciliation. State institutions of dispute resolution that focus on 
win/loss outcomes as well as penalizing wrong-doers and rewarding the wronged are therefore 
undesirable to many people in traditional societies like those in Northern Albania, Eastern Turkey 
and Sierra Leone because they escalate conflict. 
 
Unlike informal mechanisms, legal dispute resolution practices have negative impacts on 
traditional societies. Citing Walker (2004), Winsor & Skovdal argue that when applied blindly, 
legal dispute resolution practices escalate violence. According to Barry & Porter (2012), the 
practice of appointing individuals to predetermined positions of authority grounded in legal and 
political traditions undermines indigenous governance aspirations and structures by rendering 
them irrelevant in dispute resolution. Despite Barry and Porter’s argument, several African 
collectivist societies believe that the resolution of interpersonal conflicts is a collective and 
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participatory process that involves not only the primary disputants, but those indirectly affected by 
it.  Based on this argument, informal venues are suitable for resolving social conflicts and restoring 
peace and harmony (Winsor & Skovdal 2008).   
 
Reflecting similar arguments by Lederach (1995), Celik & Shkreli's findings show that Northern 
Albanians prefer informal dispute resolution mechanisms that “pursue justice in ways that respect 
people, and [at the same time] restore relationships based on recognition and amendment of 
injustices.” Northern Albanians are also found to cherish interdependence but, fear isolation as 
well as loss of societal benefits accruing from compliance with collective norms and belief 
systems. Similarly, Mac Ginty (2014) argues that “civility examines rural communities in which 
individuals rely on one another for agricultural assistance.” Interdependence as such is well 
conceived by members of collectivist societies whose survival is at risk at the individual level but 
certain at the societal level. 
 
The arguments in the above paragraphs therefore clearly show that disputants in Northern Albania, 
Israel and in Eastern Turkey prefer informal venues. For instance, religious leaders refer disputants 
to religious texts and other sources of material containing moral teachings on the importance of 
consensus, compromise, conformity and cooperation as the most desirable ways of resolving 
disputes. One of the ultimate goals of dispute resolution in Jewish cultures is to preserve peace and 
prevent disputes from escalating to violence. The Jewish sagesexplain it clearly that “pure justice 
kills peace” and vice versa (Steinberg 2000). As this argument shows, social pressures compel 
disputants to observe social order and peace. Disputants who fail to concede and compromise face 
serious punishment by highly respected local leaders. 
 
Furthermore, disputants’ cultural differences play a key role in venue selection. According to 
Powell & Wiegand (2014), similar ethnic backgrounds, gender,  and strategic values lead 
disputants to agree on informal and/or non-binding dispute resolution strategies. Contrarily, 
differences in gender and ethnicity lead to disagreement over venues. For the Sudanese, Navajo 
and Jewish people, modern dispute resolution mechanisms are alternatives to indigenous 
mechanisms because they are ambiguous, foreign and alien to local contexts. In the three societies, 
rituals play a significant role in facilitating disputants’ transition from confrontation and 
competition to cooperation and mutual acceptance(Deng 1999; Pinto 2000). 
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Dahal & Bhatta (2008) also observed that reconciliation and forgiveness ceremonies during New 
Year celebrations in Afghanistan and Pakistan indicate successful dispute resolution. During these 
special events, disputants visit each other, exchange gifts and good wishes, and receive blessings 
from elderly people and religious leaders. It is these exchange visits and blessings that lead to 
improved communication, restoration of broken relationships and confidence building among 
disputants and their families.  
 
According to Pinto (2000), young and institutionally educated Navajo people prefer legal dispute 
resolution mechanisms such as litigation, adjudication and arbitration. On the other hand, elderly 
and less educated people tend to prefer informal mechanisms. Pinto’s article further argues that 
young people are more likely to contest agreements characterized by gender and social caste biases 
under informal dispute resolution processes. Conversely, legal venues that are capable of making 
fair, just and legitimate agreements are preferable to young people than the elderly (Powell & 
Wiegand 2014). In this sense, it can be argued that members of Western societies are less willing 
to compromise fair, just and legitimate court decisions for inter-personal relationships and 
interdependence.  
 
Violent conflicts that involve death, injury and murder are serious crimes that require more 
competent and authoritative conflict managers capable of making binding and enforceable 
decisions. Monographic work by Sansculotte-Greenidge (2012) indicates that most African 
traditional dispute resolution institutions exist in political and structural vacuum that are irrelevant 
in terms of governance and dispute prevention. For instance, ADRs are perceived as less effective 
for resolving systematic and structural conflicts that result from poverty, inequality, 
discrimination, exclusion, competition over power and resources. 
 
Although arguments over worthy causes such as “life after death” are tolerable in the Jewish 
tradition, rabbis often seek assistance from third parties when such arguments threaten a 
community’s internal cohesion (Steinberg 2000). In resolving such cases, conflict managers adjust 
to disputants’ local cultures and institute community development program-like dispute resolution 
processes rather than typical legal mediation. According to Barsky (2000), managing dispute 
resolution processes like a community development program prevents  conflict from escalating to 
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violent and destructive nature. This style of dispute resolution is considered relevant for addressing 
and eliminating underlying conflict causes(Mac Ginty 2014).  
 
Further, dispute resolution mechanisms that promote tolerance and peaceful co-existence are 
relevant in culturally embedded societies. For instance, where calmness is considered as an 
appropriate trait, informal venues with no formal rules are preferable whereas legal venues are 
suitable for open expression of frustration and anger (Barsky 2000). When individuals openly 
express their emotions, it allows them release unnecessary anger that would cause conflict if 
suppressed.  
 
Dispute resolution is not an entirely “pure” process whether informal or informal venues, 
particularly in multicultural settings. Both consensual and adversarial or indigenous and legal laws 
are applicable in dispute resolution processes (Furnish 1995). In dispute resolution processes, 
conflict resolvers balance between informal and formal strategies while preserving indigenous 
dispute resolution mechanisms (Pinto 2000). Informal conflict resolvers in modern individualistic 
contexts rely on democratic dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve both ethnic and cultural 
disputes while being cautious not to violate traditional customs and norms. To be specific, 
mediating within a familiar context enables conflict resolvers to demonstrate topical, contextual 
and process/procedural expertise in the issues at stake (Shea 2016). As such, disputants tend to 
choose familiar venues in terms of procedures and mediator’s cultures (Powell & Wiegand 2014). 
Similarly, societal and cultural orientation, as well as level of exposure to foreign cultures 
influence disputants’ venue selection preferences. Despite divergent venue preferences, conflict 
resolvers in some societies simultaneously utilize formal and informal mechanisms to resolve 
disputes (Dahal & Bhatta 2008). 
 
Knowledge of local context, norms and values are also other motivating factors for venue 
selection. According to Silva (2013),educated people with good jobs and high social capital, as 
well as outstanding Christian values are the preferred conflict resolvers in modernizing Timor 
Leste. These conflict resolvers are sometimes referred to as spokespersons during marriage 
settlement negotiations. The spokespersons are basically selected because they are members of the 
same society and know about local cultures and traditions. Regardless of education, knowledge of 
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local context, Christian values, and financial status, both informal and formal conflict resolvers 
are eligible to help in dispute resolution. 
 
The formalization of traditional dispute resolution in Timor Leste started immediately when law 
number 15/92 was introduced by the state. From then, traditional judges were automatically 
empowered to resolve post-conflict crimes and abuses. The formalization of amnesty law number 
(15/2000) in Mozambiquealso empowered traditional judges to adjudicate cases perceived by 
Mozambicans as “unforgivable and unforgettable” at the local level. Despite being able to resolve 
post-conflict crimes and abuses, traditional chiefs were restricted to resolve particular minor cases 
(Igreja 2010). The law granted blanket amnesty to perpetrators of more serious wartime crimes 
and abuses thus, preventing traditional judges from adjudicating more complex cases. Nonetheless, 
the disjuncture between the needs of disputants, and of the state in relation to transitional justice 
reflects Wilson's (2001) argument. Wilson maintains that legal institutions alone cannot fulfil the 
task of providing justice because different people perceive the law and legal institutions 
differently.   
 
According to Kose & Beriker (2012), disputants in traditional societies prefer informal mediators 
such as imams, priests, village muhtars, and rabbis to legal mediators to resolve their disputes. 
Disputants in traditional settings also perceive informal mediators as knowledgeable, morally and 
religiously authoritative, as well as acting in fair and just manner. The ability by legal mediators 
to detach cultural norms, beliefs and rituals, and religious values from dispute resolution processes 
is also an important determinant for venue selection (Fisher et al. 2011). In addition, Kose & 
Beriker (2012) and Fisher et al. (2011) have stated that disputants tend to liken their venue 
preference with the ability of conflict resolvers to persuade disputants to consensus with an aim of 
preserving social harmony. As shown in the preceding paragraph, less assertive mechanisms of 
dispute resolution that result in harmony, apology, forgiveness, reconciliation, in-group obedience, 
personalized relationships and group success are admirable to members of traditional societies. As 
such, disputants’ ability to gain inner peace, restore pride and dignity play critical roles in venue 
selection in favor of informal venues. 
 
Traditional conflict resolvers also have the potential to assist disputants to apologize, forgive and 
reconcile. Thus, relieving disputants (particularly perpetrators) from guilt feelings and being held 
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accountable for damage and harm caused. The assertion that an individual’s survival is dependent 
on those around him or her also influences disputants’ choice of informal or non-binding third 
parties who are capable of helping them to reconcile and continue to live harmoniously (Kose & 
Beriker 2012; Wall & Beriker 2010). Where the “york of commandments” (or symbolic authority) 
is threatened such as during the times when Korakh rebelled against Moses in the wilderness (see 
Numbers Chapter 17), and after the “golden calf” incident involving Abraham and Lot over 
grazing land (see Exodus Chapter 32), punishments are acceptable at the expense of compromise. 
Such conflicts that threaten symbolic authorities necessitate intervention by more authoritative 
conflict resolvers who are endowed with leverage and enforcement capability.  
 
The resolution of disputes such as domestic violence that threaten to erode societal values and 
traditions also necessitate the role of notable family, religious and community members (Zion & 
Zion 1993). In the Navajo community, informal dispute resolution is perceived to be effective in 
preventing disputes from spiraling and disrupting social life. According to Dahal & Bhatta (2008), 
highly contested disputes are managed by encouraging disputants to cooperate and concede rather 
than demanding for evidence and relying on majority vote for decision-making. Kose and Beriker 
(2012) maintain that elopement and murder are two examples of complicated crimes in Eastern 
Turkey whose resolution requires the intervention of informal conflict resolvers. In their article, 
Kose and Beriker argue that when elopement is likened with abduction, killing the couple is a 
preferred way to cleanse the woman’s family’s “honor”, and where compensation (in cash or 
giving another woman to the affected family) is possible, the statuses of the two families, level of 
violence in the elopement, history of dispute between the two families and statuses of the eloped 
woman determine the mediation outcome. Thus, compromise is undesirable for resolving complex 
social and cultural disputes like elopement that threaten social order in the case of Eastern Turkey.  
 
Nonetheless, the Mozambican adjudication of “unforgivable and unforgettable” offenses offers 
informal mediators alternatives to resolve complex issues by persuading perpetrators to either 
acknowledge or deny the accusations made by victims. Both victims and conflict resolvers invoke 
spiritual powers as a means to inflict catastrophic consequences for concealing truth about a 
particular crime (Igreja 2010). Where wrong-doing is acknowledged, disputants negotiate 
reparation and compensation upon whose payment, a dispute is finally resolved, and peace and 
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social life would be restored. Otherwise, the occurrence of tragedies implies that truth was never 
said despite crime being committed.  
2.3.2. Anthropological Literature on Dispute Resolution 
 
The anthropological literature outlines numerous factors that influence venue selection strategies 
for dispute resolution, but the most critical ones include amount of financial, social and material 
power and anticipated settlement outcome. Some anthropoligcal scholars argue that weak 
disputants prefer informal conflict resolvers while strong disputants prefer legal mechanisms 
(Powell & Wiegand 2014; Dahal & Bhatta 2008; Brickell 2015; Barsky 2000). Weak disputants, 
according to these scholars are more likely to lose cases in legal than in informal courts. Despite 
the worry of losing cases by weak disputants in legal courts, conflict resolvers address power 
asymmetry by persuading strong parties to act with sincerity and show peaceful intensions in order 
to encourage consensus and compromise. 
 
Due to weak financial statuses among female Cambodian disputants who were more vulnerable 
than men during negotiations and court arbitration, traditional venues served as their most 
preferred dispute resolution avenues.According to Barsky (2000), powerful and competitive 
negotiators who conceal information and threaten weak disputants are better placed in dispute 
resolution than those who are weak and afraid of seeking court arbitration. Weak disputants are 
noted to fear legal venues because of their settlement uncertainties that would drastically affect 
their marriage relationships in the case of Cambodia. In some modern societies, bottom-up or 
social code based on caste system obstructs attempts by conflict resolvers to address educational, 
social, and financial disparities between males and females, and between weak and strong 
disputants (Dahal & Bhatta 2008). A caste system thus discriminates against particular groups of 
people while favoring others.  
 
Some local arbitrators and mediators in traditional societies tend to rely on coercive rather than 
persuasive and collaborative means of dispute resolution because their actions are dictated by 
societal norms, values and beliefs. Such coercive strategies produce dissatisfying outcomes and 
biased decisions against weak parties in favor of strong disputants. Although, losers in court 
arbitration have the opportunity to appeal to higher authorities, their low financial statuses 
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constrain their willingness to make such appeals. This is because the chances of winning in legal 
courts are low and uncertain. 
 
In the event that a woman pursues legal arbitration to settle a domestic violence case in a traditional 
society, the likelihood of this woman experiencing extreme suffering, ridiculing and humiliation 
is high if the settlement outcome is divorce. This is because the husband will stop giving her the 
needed financial and material assistance to sustain her life. Upon divorce, poor women find it 
difficult to resettle in society because they are regarded as social misfits who violate societal norms 
even if they are seeking justice (Brickell 2015). For this reason, women pursue informal 
mechanisms to settle their domestic issues with an aim to reconcile and continue living in harmony 
with their partners.  
 
Some societies that utilize both informal and legal dispute resolution venues such as Cambodia 
offer the best options for disputants to choose specific mechanisms that suit their problems 
(Brickell 2015; Pinto 2000). In this case, women as well as other vulnerable disputants do not need 
to go to legal courts seeking for solutions to their disputes. Thus, the issues of financial, material 
and social inequality are sufficiently addressed by the mere presence of dual dispute resolution 
venues. Another argument by Pinto (2000) that also resolves the problem of inequality is that, 
conflict resolvers often assure disputants  that any abuses against (and deviance from) settlement 
outcome is punishable. Conflict resolvers also assure disputants that no judge or lawyer is involved 
in the dispute resolution process who can influence the final outcomes.  
 
Disputants’ ability and/or inability to afford court fees, time and distance/location where the 
process of dispute resolution takes place also influences venue selection processes. Kim et al. 
(1993) argue that (relatively uneducated) disputants in traditional societies are reluctant to go to 
court because they are suspicious of being suckered by court clerks. In addition to the burden of 
court fees, disputants are hesitant to go to legal courts for fear of binding settlements that may be 
unfavorable to them especially when they lose. Because most legal dispute resolution venues are 
located in urban areas, disputants find it difficult to travel long distances due to related transport, 
accommodation and feeding costs especially when the process takes place far away from one’s 
own place of residence. In this sense, financially poor disputants tend to prefer nearby informal 
venues so as to evade these unnecessary costs.  
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Dahal & Bhatta (2008) also echo similar remarks like those of Kim et al. by arguing that the 
Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) and Maoist courts were perceived as unpopular and 
inappropriate to settle local disputes due to their focus on punitive measures, imposition of 
exorbitant taxes and less experienced adjudicators. Hence, eroding the trust of the Nepalese people 
in legal courts. According to Henrysson et al. (2009), cost effectiveness, efficiency in terms of 
speed and time spent on dispute resolution, and familiarity with customary dispute adjudication 
mechanisms make informal courts more preferable than legal courts. Powell & Wiegand (2014) 
on their part assert that in commercial disputes, business people risk losing both in terms of time 
and money if they choose to go to legal courts at far distances. 
 
Conteh (2014) argues that poor disputants often criticize local chiefs for imposing exorbitant fines 
which they [disputants] cannot afford. As such, community peace volunteers also known as 
CPVsin Sierra Leone became the most preferred and effective peace makers because their services 
were free and accessible. Dahal & Bhatta (2008) extends Conteh’s argument further by claiming 
that community mediation is faster, less bureaucratic and time saving. De Juan et al. (2015) also 
argue that the presence of informal venues such as worship places that are easily accessible 
presents an attractive alternative to relatively poor disputants with limited financial capabilities. In 
addition to being seen as legitimate, De Juan et al. argues that religious leaders are also applauded 
for offering free service to disputants. The arguments by Conteh, De Juan et al. and Kim et al. 
altogether demonstrate that closeness between disputants and dispute resolution venues minimizes 
unnecessary financial costs.  
 
Unlike informal courts located far in rural areas, disputants incur financial costs whenever they 
chose legal venues. Nevertheless, this is not the case with financially stable and well educated 
individuals who prefer courts and anticipate win/loss outcome regardless of the court procedure. 
Moreover, legal courts are often overwhelmed with cases hence, making them less appealing to 
disputants since they take long periods of time before a single case is resolved. Worse still is the 
complicated procedures of courts that are both tedious and difficult to understand especially by 
less educated people.  
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2.3.3. International Relations Literature on Conflict Resolution 
 
According to Lefler (2015), the enforceability of agreements depends on the amount of leverage 
and legitimacy vested in legal conflict resolvers. Weak venues that lack legitimacy and leverage, 
according to Shea (2016), are less likely to be accepted by disputants because they are unable to 
cajole disputants towards agreement. The fact is that weak venues that are unable to induce “sticks” 
and “carrots” make them less preferable compared to coercive mediators that act proactively in 
both threatening and convincing manners.   
 
Legal and trained mediators offer attractive dispute resolution venues to members of modern 
societies. To resolve complex issues such as murder, security and armed robbery that are usually 
more prevalent in urban centers than in rural settings, disputants require the help of legal mediators, 
arbitrators and adjudicators who have greater power and means to enforce settlements. Informal 
third parties are unlikely to mediate complex cases because the implementation process is 
problematic especially when disputants show little willingness and/or are uncompliant with final 
decisions. Moreover, the absence of “sticks” and “carrots” constrain informal venues from 
enforcing settlements.  
 
Research conducted in Turkey and Egypt indicates that female Turkish and Egyptian disputants 
have different venue preferences for dispute resolution (Belge & Blaydes 2013). The research 
findings show that the latter prefer informal dispute resolution mechanisms while the former prefer 
legal mechanisms. In my view, female Turkish disputants should not be worried about settlement 
enforcement since non-compliance is intolerable in legal courts. For female Egyptian disputants, 
the level of social capital also influences venue selection. Individuals who are well-connected to 
the state and its justice system are more likely to report their disputes to legal courts than those 
without social connections. At the same time, low-income female Egyptian disputants accuse legal 
courts and court officials of corruption, overloading of cases, lack of independence, and poor 
settlement enforcement capabilities (Dahal & Bhatta 2008).  
 
The nature of dispute resolution process also poses a challenge to disputants. Conflict parties 
experience difficulties in choosing either a less or more complex and less or more bureaucratic 
dispute resolution venue. While deciding, disputants consider rules, procedures, structure and 
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amount of time spent during a particular dispute resolution process. An example of a dispute 
resolution venue without specific procedures and rules that does not cater for disputants’ cultural 
norms, values and beliefs is the Jewish mediation (Steinberg 2000). Disputants in modern 
individualistic societies are less likely to opt for venues such as the Jewish ones without proper 
rules and procedures. This is because these venues do not show how settlements are arrived at (that 
is, the outcomes of such dispute resolution venues are uncertain). In traditional societies however, 
disputants are comfortable with an outcome that restores relationships, social harmony and 
reconciliation. Whether there are rules and procedures or not, is less of a concern to members of 
traditional societies.  
 
Kose and Beriker (2012) maintain that the ulema and religious notables are the most preferred 
mediators for resolving conflicts over theft, money, adultery and elopement in Eastern Turkey. 
The closeness between the ulema, religious notables and disputants enables them to meet prior to 
commencement of any dispute resolution process. Prior meeting is important for pre-mediation 
and enables mediators to better understand and gather more information as well as encourage 
disputants to cooperate and resolve their differences peacefully.  At times, mediators promise 
financial and material incentives to weaker parties both as a means to persuade them toward 
concession and to enhance their bargaining capability (Kose & Beriker 2012; Wall & Beriker 
2010). 
 
According to Kose & Beriker (2012), Wall et al. (2010) and Steinberg (2000), religious mediators 
refer disputants to symbolic and moral scripts such as the Holy Quran and Bible to guide disputants 
on the need to peacefully resolve their differences. The Nepalese dispute resolution process led by 
council of elders (also known as gram parishad) is tasked with resolving disputes by facilitating 
discussions between adversaries, identifying common interests and assisting disputants to 
formulate mutually beneficial solutions (Dahal & Bhatta 2008). Final settlements are legitimized 
by sacred institutional duties (dharma) in a manner consistent with local customs and morality. 
 
Venue selection is further influenced by mediators’ ability to help their clients to make rational 
decisions that produce mutual benefits. Based on arguments by rational choice and prisoners’ 
dilemma theorists (see Axelrod 1997; Rapoport 1974; Schelling 1980 for decision-making based 
on rational choice), dispute resolution denotes a process of making rational decisions aimed at 
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benefitting the players involved as well as reducing negative outcomes of the dispute resolution 
process on both sides. Powell & Wiegand (2014) observed that disputants make strategic decisions 
on whether to resort to legal or traditional venues by focusing on their past experience with a 
particular venue. For instance, a disputant is more likely to return to a legal venue where the 
outcome was favorable but, will never return to the same venue if the outcome was unfavorable. 
Instead, a loser at a previous venue is more likely to switch to a new venue hoping for fair outcome.  
 
Moreover, the uncertainties surrounding legal courts discourage disputants who are unfamiliar 
with legal laws and processes from pursuing settlements of their problems using formal means. To 
address the complexities surrounding legal venues and their unpredictable natures, conflict 
resolvers often persuade disputants to cooperate and bargain so as to arrive at mutually benefitting 
solutions. As such, disputants seek equal gains with minimal losses by evoking the give-and-take 
strategy – meaning that disputants simply accept any solution as a way out of a problem even if it 
does not necessarily fully satisfy their needs and interests. 
 
Viewed as a highly competitive game motivated by greed and belief that best outcomes are often 
achieved by forcing opponents to concede to one’s demands, disputants end up with undesirable 
outcomes as a result of mutual cooperation2. Such style of dispute resolution makes stronger parties 
to push the weaker ones to the brink before arriving at consensus and compromise particularly 
when anticipated outcomes are unpleasant. Such incidences in dispute resolution also occur when 
trust does not exist between the parties either because of information problems or general lack of 
trust in the mediation process. If not well managed, disputants are likely to experience what 
Madani & Lund (2010) call “chicken game”. The chicken game is a form of legal dispute 
resolution through rational choice and avoidance of head-on collisions which is, in general, 
unsuccessful in traditional contexts.  
 
Where disputants are highly competitive, and mediators lack the leverage necessary to persuade 
them to make consensus, neutral and impartial mediators find it difficult to ensure cooperation and 
compromise. In such situations, Beardsley (2011) argues that weak mediators offer the best option 
                                                          
2Marina Krakovsky writes about Professor Nir Halevy’s perception of game theory and how to better understand and manage 
disputes in politics and business. 
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for disputants with sincere intentions of resolving their problems. Disputants who doubt the 
outcomes of mediation processes tend to seek assistance from more professional mediators capable 
of helping them to predict settlement outcomes in order to avoid uncertainties and risks. Disputants 
faced with more contentious disagreements and have little trust in legal venues also often refer to 
informal venues that offer non-binding agreements without commitment problems.  
 
Based on the literature review above, the following three factors are identified as the most 
influential in venue selection processes.  
 
i. Norms and values under which perception of legitimacy and third party reputation, sense 
of justice and harmony, and venue familiarity can be enlisted. 
ii. Venue characteristics such as fairness, justice and capability of making favorable 
settlements. 
iii. Practicality in terms of accessibility, affordability, speed of resolution, and nature of 
dispute resolution processes. 
2.4.Main Hypothesis 
 
The critical evaluation of the factors that determine individuals’ venue selection processes above 
indicate that leverage, enforcement capability, competence and track record of successful dispute 
resolution, procedural setup, desire for justice and fairness, harmony, and an overall familiarity 
with court systems significantly influence venue preference. Most of these factors characterize 
legal courts, although harmony matters to a greater extent to members of traditional societies. 
Therefore, it can be hypothesized that legal disputant resolution mechanisms are more preferable 
than traditional mechanisms for resolving more serious conflicts. 
2.4.1. Secondary Hypotheses 
 
i. High issue salience leads disputants to prefer formal over informal venues. 
ii. Equal issue salience leads disputants to agree on informal venues. 
iii. Similar cultural background and similar gender lead disputants to prefer informal venues. 
iv. Dissimilar cultural background and different gender lead disputants to disagree 
overformal venues. 
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v. Formal venue preference is dependent on place of residence. 
The assumptions below led to the above hypotheses: Issues such as land grabbing, murder, rape 
and defilement require venues with leverage and authority that can induce and enforce settlements 
to satisfy “deserving disputants” by making favorable decisions to those who have evidence for 
their cases. On the other hand, when contested issues are of less salience to disputants such as 
small amount of money borrowed, fight in drinking places and at water wells, gossiping and 
suspicion for theft, disputants refer to informal venues. Such decisions to rely on informal venues 
is influenced by the importance attached to peaceful relationships among members of traditional 
settings; accessibility and affordability; informality in terms of procedures considering the fact that 
less educated people do not understand complex rules in courts and police, and speed of resolution. 
It is also expected that disputants in rural settings prefer informal venues while those in urban areas 
go to legal venues. Yet, females prefer traditional mechanisms to legal forums of dispute 
resolution. 
2.5.Conclusion 
 
Venue selection for dispute resolution depends on many factors. A disputant’s past experience 
with a particular venue, related costs and distance, familiarity with venue and compatibility with 
local cultures; transparency, distributional bias and issue salience; nature and venue procedures; 
sense of justice and desire to preserve social harmony altogether influence venue selection 
strategies. As elaborated in the literature review, members of traditional societies align more with 
informal, casual and less complex dispute resolution processes whose main purpose is to reconcile 
disputants and restore broken relationships. These informal mechanisms are forums for disputants 
to discuss their differences and arrive at settlements through consensus and compromise rather 
than committing to binding decisions as is the case in legal courts.  
 
Often, an agreement is sealed by rituals and traditional celebrations to imply the commitment by 
disputants to full implementation of settlements. In contrast, members of modern societies perceive 
legal venues as credible and legitimate. The legal basis of arbitration and adjudication courts 
reinforces disputants’ trust in, and hope that agreements reached are enforceable provided both 
parties agree and sign. Unlike in informal dispute resolution, legal processes usually produce 
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win/loss settlements. Thus, victory is personal rather than communal as may be the case in informal 
venues. 
 
Furthermore, informal and legal dispute resolution processes differ in terms of procedures and 
rules. For instance, informal mediators such as religious leaders, elders and chiefs (in Philippines) 
often start dispute resolution processes with prayers while Catholic mediators in the United States 
(U.S.) do not pray either (Wall & Beriker 2010). The U.S. – Philippines contrast suggests a 
refinement in the cultural effects model namely, that subjective cultural elements not only affect 
social behavior and mediators’ behavior but, they  also moderate the effect of social behavior on 
mediation (Wall & Beriker 2010). In nut shell, venue selection varies between members of 
traditional societies and individualists in modern societies, religious or irreligious people, literate 
and illiterate, poor and rich, and men and women.  
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
 
3.1.Background Information about South Sudan 
 
South Sudan is a new state established on July 09, 2011 after two decades of civil war with Sudan. 
The first civil war ran from 1955 before and after Sudan gained independence from Britain to 1972 
and ended with the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement in Ethiopia. Eleven years later, the 
second civil war started in 1983 when the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) rose against 
the oppressive Sudanese regime. In 2005, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed 
in which the people of South Sudan were granted the right of self-determination. In exercise of 
this right on January 9, 2011, ninety-nine percent of the people of South Sudan voted in favor of 
secession. 
 
However, South Sudan currently faces numerous challenges among them re-building an 
impoverished justice system. Some of the challenges facing the programme of re-building the 
justice system in South Sudan include weak institutional capacity, unqualified or semi-qualified 
personnel, limited budget, poor roads and communications networks that prevent police from 
accessing rural areas where there help is most needed (Baker & Scheye 2009). In South Sudan, as 
elsewhere in transitioning polities in the third world, an effective justice system is key to a 
country’s stability and sustainable peace.  
 
An interesting scenario is that, despite efforts by the government of South Sudan to establish and 
strengthen modern justice systems, customary laws continue to supplement modern justice systems 
and play an important role in dispute resolution at the grassroots levels (Baker & Scheye 2009; 
Baker 2010). Because of this complementarity, the distinction between legal and traditional court 
systems is blurred. In fact, the endogenous institutions have been there in South Sudan forever. 
The justice system in South Sudan ranges from the lowest levels such as boma and payam where 
headmen, sub-chiefs, and chiefs preside as judges and magistrates and rely on traditional 
knowledge to adjudicate, arbitrate and mediate.  
 
The Boma is the lowest administrative unit while the Payam is second lowest in the order of Local 
Government structures. At these two levels, are traditional courts. Similarly, at the County, State 
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and National levels are the legal courts such as County Court, Supreme Court and Court of Appeal. 
The customary law courts at the boma and payam levels deal with minor cases such as disputed 
marriage, elopement, suspicion for witchcraft, theft and quarrels/fight. Modern courts such as the 
High Court or Court of Appeal handle more complex issues like murder, rape, defilement and 
political crimes like treason (Baker & Scheye 2009; Baker 2010).  
 
It is also important to note that, in some cases in South Sudan, both laws complement each other, 
while, in others, one substitutes the other. Moreover, international organizations like United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) recognize the role of traditional justice systems as the cornerstone of 
dispute resolution and access to justice in post-conflict societies (Baker & Scheye 2009). These 
organizations argue that traditional justice systems are perceived by poor people in traditional 
societies to be effective, affordable and accessible, easy to understand and culturally compatible.  
 
Like in most transitioning polities, court type preference in South Sudan is influenced by 
individuals’ culture; dispute intensity; speed of resolution; perception of legitimacy and reputation 
of conflict resolvers; sense of fairness and justice; the need to preserve harmony; venue familiarity 
and compatibility in terms of culture; anticipated settlement outcome based on past experience 
with a particular court type; cost-benefit analysis; level of transparency and decision control over 
dispute resolution process and issue salience. Minor disputes are usually referred to local chiefs 
while major crimes such as murder, theft, adultery, and rape, defilement go to legal courts since 
they are legally defined as criminal offenses for which more competent legal courts are capable of 
resolving (GoSS 2009; Ministry of Jusitce 2008; Deng 2013; Jok et al. 2004).  
 
In rare cases where individuals are confronted with issues like murder, adultery and land grabbing 
that prompts them to take the law into their hands, the police often directly intervene hence, 
preventing free choice over courts. The complementarity of customary and modern laws therefore 
brings to the fore an important question: when individuals choose venues for resolving disputes, 
under what circumstances do they choose either customary or modern courts? And why? 
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3.2.Site Description – Yei Municipality 
 
Yei Municipality was established by a presidential decree in 2013. Its estimated population is 
11,1268 people according to a household head-count exercise conducted by South Sudan Center 
for Census and Statistical Evaluation (SSCCSE) in 2010.It is located in Yei River State which is 
one of South Sudan’s most peaceful societies hosting thousands of people from different ethnic 
groups including foreign nationals. Although Mundu boma was/is not under the administration of 
Yei Municipality at the time when this survey was conducted, its people often travel to Yei to 
access social services such as health, education, market, and legal services provided by police and 
courts.  
 
Pakula is a quarter council under Yei Municipality and both locations (that is, Mundu and Pakula) 
are approximately twenty miles away from Yei town quarter council. The common language for 
the people of all the three locations is Juba Arabic while Kakwa/Bari is the dialect for Yei and 
Pakula respectively. It is also widely known throughout South Sudan that the people of Yei are 
more civilized, peaceful and religious.  
 
Geographically, Yei is located at the extreme South of the country and borders Uganda to the 
South and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the West. This location makes it strategic for 
business purposes, although subsistence agriculture and hunting are the two major economic 
activities practiced by the people of Yei to sustain their livelihoods. A map showing rule of law 
institutions in Yei can be found at appendix 2, and a figure illustrating statutory and customary 
law courts at appendix 3.  
3.3.Sample Selection Criteria and Description 
 
Three hundred (300) respondents were selected for this research using non-probability 
convenience sampling. In each of the three locations, 100 respondents were selected. Training 
attendance lists were obtained from local civil society organizations3 (CSOs) operating in Yei 
Municipality from which respondents were selected based on gender, ethnicity, educational status, 
occupation and place of residence. Phayal, Khadka, & Thyne (2015) argue that these five variables 
                                                          
3Community Empowerment for Rehabilitation and Development, Center for Democracy and Development, Organization for Socio-
Economic Transformation, Center for Democracy Initiative. 
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are important in the selection of respondents because they help in capturing both community- and 
individual-level variations in social, cultural, economic and political aspects. For the purpose of 
this paper, selecting respondents based on the above variables is important in understanding how 
they influence forum selection. Basedau & Koos(2015) also observe that the above variables are 
important for testing hypothesis.  
 
Comparatively, Yei is more urbanized, culturally diverse with an emerging individualistic culture, 
liberal and fast democratizing society. Yei also has higher literacy rate than the two other two 
research sites. On the other hand, Pakula and Mundu are mono-cultural, rural, and collectivist 
societies with low literacy rate. Hence, their selection is important in this research to test the 
research hypotheses. Deng (2013) argues that poor and uneducated rural dwellers go to informal 
courts while rich and educated urban dwellers prefer legal courts. Because poor and uneducated 
rural dwellers generally lack basic understanding of the procedures in formal courts, they tend to 
prefer informal courts, which are less bureaucratic and less complicated in terms of procedures. 
Moreover, Deng argues that cultural norms and values influence individuals’ choice of justice 
mechanisms differently. For instance, most women rely on informal justice systems that focus on 
reconciling them with their husbands rather than those that separate them. Women often end up 
getting less property [inheritance] and child-custody rights compared with men when cases are 
handled in courts. Men usually choose formal dispute resolution mechanisms if they intend to 
divorce and take full custody of children and property.  
 
In South Sudan, most court rulings especially on marriage and divorce cases whether in informal 
or formal courts, grant more child custody and property rights to men than women. This difference 
in child custody rights stems from women’s low economic status who are assumed to be incapable 
of giving proper care to the children once given to them. Because of the fact that some women 
seek second marriage after divorcing the first, second or third husband, they end up on the 
disadvantageous side.  Furthermore, cases like rape and defilement are mostly blamed on women 
for violating established social and moral norms. Upon completion of the interview, the 
respondents were debriefed about the selection process and the research itself. The selection 
process was done by the main investigator (while also coordinating on phone, Facebook and email) 
with experienced research assistants on the ground. Selection and recruitment results are presented 
in Table 1.  
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3.4.Why this Sample? 
 
Selecting a random sample for this study required an infeasible budget. More specifically, 
obtaining a representative sampling frame is almost impossible in the South Sudanese context with 
current resources. Yet, obtaining a sampling frame for the research was difficult due to 
inaccessibility to remote locations in Mundu and Pakula that experienced some insecurity during 
the time of the conflict in South Sudan between 2013 and 2015.  As a result, I instead opted to 
conduct surveys with informed members of their respective communities in Yei Municipality, who 
are often selected to represent their communities in local meetings as well as in meetings with 
either NGOs or local government officials. The assumption is that these respondents will – to the 
best extent possible render a comprehensive picture of the underlying dynamics of forum selection 
in conflict resolution in their respective communities. At the time of data collection Mundu boma 
was under Yei River County. Respondents in Mundu and Pakula were selected for this research 
because most often people from the area also access services such as health, education, courts, 
police, and markets in Yei town. In a way, the sampling technique biases our results by mainly 
representing elite views. Perhaps, if a random technique was used to select the sample, the results 
would holistically represent the views of the entire population. 
3.5.Research Assistants 
 
Interviewers were issued with interview guidelines/handouts so as to act according to professional 
research ethics. Interviewers were also given a short quiz about survey research and face-to-face 
interview as a data collection method. The quiz is important to determine the abilities of research 
assistants in conducting surveys. One of the research assistants was a former census official whom 
the main investigator worked with in 2008 during the 5th Sudan Population and Housing Census. 
This raises the level of confidence that the surveys were conducted diligently. Another research 
assistant also helped two other previous researchers; one from Uganda Martyrs University and 
another from Cavendish University in Uganda. A third research assistant is a community social 
worker. The fourth one is a youth leader. The remaining two research assistants were supervised 
by the census official and the other experienced research assistants. These two inexperienced 
research assistants collected data from separate communities. 
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3.6.Data Collection 
 
The survey was conducted in the month of April, 2016. Prior to the survey, research assistants 
familiarized themselves with the research sites and targeted respondents. By the time the survey 
started they had established rapport with the respondents. Nonetheless, research assistants were 
cautioned by the main researcher not to be too intimate with respondents in order to ease their exit 
from the field. Moreover, maintaining lose relationships with respondents helps to prevent 
psychological issues such as a respondent missing an interviewer (and vice versa) especially if 
they had already established strong relationship that none would want to see it end.  
 
Research assistants took advantage of community meetings, workshops, prayers programmes, 
funeral functions, and marriage functions where most research subjects were present to agree on 
possible interview data, time and place. Each research assistant was assigned fifty respondents of 
which twenty-five were males and females respectively for each of the three locations. After 
successfully completing a survey with a respondent, the research assistant ticks his/her name in 
the list produced by the main investigator during the sampling process. As such, those respondents 
who failed to appear in any of the events mentioned above were easily traced based on their 
telephone numbers and physical addresses provided in the list4.  
 
Of the 300 samples, 288 respondents took part in the surveys and twelve others were missed or 
may have refused despite initial consent. In spite of this small number failing to participate in the 
research, the response rate was generally high enough to allow for inference to be made on the 
entire population which is not the purpose of this research. One possible explanation for this high 
response rate is due to the well-established rapport, as well as some small monetary incentives 
provided to the research assistants who felt obliged to complete all tasks assigned to them.  
 
Data for this thesis was obtained from three locations; Yei town and Pakula quarter councils and 
Mundu boma in Tore Payam. Therefore, the analysis and tabular presentations in this paper are 
based on primary data. The surveys were conducted with the help of six research assistants: two 
in each location. An additional contact person helped in distributing and receiving back filled 
                                                          
4 The names of respondents were obtained from lists provided by project officers of local organizations working in the three research 
areas.  
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questionnaires from the field. The contact person also assisted in entering the data in excel sheet 
before the questionnaires were later scanned and emailed to the main investigator. 
 
Throughout the data collection process, regular phone calls, Facebook and email communications 
helped in guiding interviewers on some challenges that arose in the field such as non-responses 
and ensuring equitable gender representation. Moreover, the main investigator was able to 
supervise and guide the entire data collection process based on the information provided by the 
interviewers and the contact person. Of the 288 respondents who participated in the surveys, forty 
received self-administered questionnaires since they are literate and have limited time to attend 
scheduled surveys. These forty respondents are known to have taken part in a number of research 
projects conducted by other researchers and were recruited for this particular study based on 
opportunistic sampling (Topp et al. 2015).The remaining 248 were interviewed face-to-face by six 
interviewers.  
3.7.Data Collection Instrument 
 
A structured questionnaire was used to collect information on respondents’ demographics, types 
of disputes, venue selection and motivation for venue selection, and frequency of visiting a 
particular venue. Answers to these questions provide information on which court types are more 
preferable and which ones are not, and whether demographic characteristics influence venue 
selection processes. All questions asked were open-ended. Open-ended questions are appropriate 
because they enable the researcher to obtain in-depth understanding of social settings as well as 
identifying the research subjects’ beliefs and values that underlie the phenomena being studied. 
Asking open-ended questions generated enormous data that was quantified and analyzed using 
STATA (14).  
 
A few reported challenges such as translating responses from Arabic and Kakwa to English 
emerged but were rectified by the main investigator by making phone calls to particular 
respondents whose responses were unclear hence maintaining data reliability. The survey was 
structured in a face-to-face interactive manner between the respondent and interviewer in which 
first-hand information obtained from the respondents was immediately recorded in his/her words 
in English and Kakwa in Yei, and Arabic in Mundu.  
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Respondents were asked to tell 1) the most recent problem they faced, 2) to which venue the 
problem was reported for resolution, 3) why the particular venue is preferred? and 4) to where they 
would report problems such as rape/defilement, elopement/adultery, murder, theft, land grabbing, 
debt, child custody, and road accident. Despite limiting the responses to the problems outlined here 
above, different types of problems and venues emerged. These additional problems were therefore 
classified and coded accordingly into three main categories; that is, civil (1), economic/financial 
(2), and criminal (3) offences and “others” for unspecified venues. Some issues such as none-
response were coded -88 while missing took code -99. Other demographic questions asked include 
educational attainment, occupation, age, place of residence, means of transport, means of 
communication, source of news, source of light, and gender.  
3.8.Measuring Socioeconomic Status 
 
In this thesis, level of education, occupation, means of transport, means of communication, source 
of news, and place of residence are used to measure socio-economic statuses. As such, two 
categories emerged rich and poor. The category of rich people is characterized by attainment of 
tertiary/higher diploma, some tertiary, employed as civil servants, civil society, private business, 
in possession of motor vehicle, uses internet/smartphone/newspaper for news and communication, 
and resides in urban areas in Yei, specifically. Poor people are students, unemployed or employed 
as casual laborers, tea boilers, office messengers, farmers, boda-boda riders, those who own only 
a bicycle, cellphone, those who do not have electricity, those without television, those unable to 
afford newspapers or none of all the above at all, and reside in rural areas in Pakula and Mundu.  
3.8.1. Pre-test, Internal Validity and Reliability 
 
Since pre-test was done with five voluntary respondents in English, Arabic and Kakwa in the three 
locations respectively, threats to internal validity were to a large extent minimized. The feedback 
from the pre-test helped to clarify issues that were difficult to understand. As such, the language 
used in the questionnaires was explicitly simplified such that even a primary school pupil is able 
to read and understand. The only bias that could have threatened internal validity was the method 
of respondents’ selection which targeted relatively educated people.  
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Using non-probability convenience, specific individuals who are chosen by their communities to 
represent them in public meetings were selected. This selection method neglects those individuals 
who might be interested in the research, but because they do not represent their communities during 
meetings, their names could not be found in the attendance lists obtained from local civil society 
organizations. Moreover, this method of sample selection risks the results of the research since it 
is based on assumption that what the respondents say is also what the community would say had 
they taken part in the research. 
3.8.2. Obtaining Approval and Maintaining Confidentiality 
 
Approval to engage research participants was not directly obtained from local authorities such as 
the municipal mayor, paramount chief, county commissioners, or even the state governor. Rather, 
participants were directly contacted to take part in the surveys. For security reasons and worries 
about being denied access to the research sites, and considering the fact that South Sudan was 
faced with civil war during the time of data collection, access to all sites was made possible with 
the help of the local CSOs from whom attendance lists were obtained that also implement projects 
in the three research sites.  
 
Although not entirely insiders, the research assistants’ presence within the research sites was 
perceived as normal without any suspicion that the project was either government or rebel 
sponsored (a mentality that most people in Yei have particularly during the civil war).  The fact 
that the research topic closely relates to conflict, dispute, or some sort of disagreement is enough 
reason to discourage some people from participating. Further, the rampant arrests and detention of 
political opponents during the 2013/2015 civil war in South Sudan based on suspicion might have 
also caused the fourteen respondents to decline from participating in the surveys. To gain trust 
from the research subjects, their anonymity, privacy and confidentiality of every information 
shared with respondents was assured, and that, unless they accept, no information can be shared 
with anyone whether being part of the research or not.  
3.8.3. Consent and Voluntary Participation 
 
All surveys were conducted with the respondents’ verbal consent. Respondents who could not 
complete one interview at a particular time were allowed to temporarily suspend the process and 
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resume later at an agreed time. This kind of arrangement was necessary because it enabled 
respondents to take their own time and rethink whether they should continue the survey or 
withdraw forever. Furthermore, allowing participants to decide whether to continue or discontinue 
interviews is ethically appropriate, and is in line with their right of voluntary participation. 
 
Precisely, letting respondents to stop the interview process allowed them to assess whether or not 
any harm has been caused against them by the research assistants, or if they are being exposed to 
political risks such as arrest and detention. The research aim and objectives were also clearly 
explained to each and every respondent so as to create an atmosphere of trust, comfort, and 
confidence where both the research assistants and research subjects are knowledgeable about the 
topic being studied, and also to guarantee the subjects that the research is purely for academic 
purposes which will later benefit them and their entire communities. Since it was not feasible to 
bring together all the respondents at a single time to be notified about actual survey process, the 
research assistants took advantage of community meetings and social gatherings to remind 
research subjects about the program. Indirectly or directly, OSET, the organization where the 
researcher’s main contact person works assisted the research assistants in obtaining voluntary 
consent of participation. 
3.8.4. Description of Dispute Resolution Processes in South Sudan 
 
With the establishment of the new state, the judiciary process in South Sudan was overhauled. This 
has led to the establishment of the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal, High Court, and County 
Courts as formal mechanisms, and Chiefs’ Courts, Regional Courts’, and Payam Courts as 
informal mechanisms.5 The manner in which both the formal and informal courts operate in South 
Sudan is almost indistinguishable. That is to say, whether in informal or formal courts, chiefs, 
magistrates, and judges follow similar dispute resolution processes and strategies.  
 
A case begins with disputants making oral or written petitions addressed to a chief or legal judge 
depending on the type or magnitude of the dispute in question. After a thorough review, a chief or 
judge decides to either admit the petition as a case or reject it. Thereafter, disputants (together with 
their witnesses) are summoned to appear in court. Otherwise, a retainer (police officer) is deployed 
                                                          
5 This description of the informal and formal dispute resolution processes emanates from Jok, Leitch, & Vandewint (2004) as well 
as from the Transitional Consitituion of South Sudan (2011). 
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to collect the accused in case of resistance or failure to show up in court. The police officer who 
is tasked with investigation and law enforcement is usually assigned by chiefs and judges to arrest 
and detain perpetrators if found guilty. At later times when a detainee is unable to bail himself or 
herself, the prisons department takes over the task of long-term detention ranging from one month 
and more. One major difference between chiefs’ and legal courts’/police detention facilities is that, 
the former basically paroles detainees because of poor detention facilities. While at the latter, 
perpetrators are detained in concrete prison cells though with relatively poor standards. Therefore, 
formal justice systems have more enforcement capability than informal systems in terms of 
detaining culprits. 
 
In informal courts, chiefs preside over cases while trained lawyers and judges preside over cases 
in formal courts. After comprehensive and inclusive discussions involving both the accused and 
accuser, judgments are issued by chiefs in informal courts that reflect the main points of the 
discussion. Similarly, in formal courts, judges rely on discussions by primary parties and their 
legally assigned representatives, as well as legal instruments to make judgments. In both courts, 
testimonies and/or oaths and touching of a Bible form part of the evidence or prove of innocence 
or guilt. Disputants are also entitled to limitless appeals to higher courts to seek redress of their 
issues if they feel dissatisfied with first settlements. Until a court or police order is implemented, 
no settlement is done yet. In such instances especially in informal courts, retainers are empowered 
to demand compensation, if not, any property worth the fine is confiscated from the defendant 
(accused/guilty person) to compensate the victim who is also the case winner. 
 
When a case appears before a court, the first step is to determine whether or not the case falls 
within the jurisdiction of that particular court to hear it. The Chiefs’ Court and Regional Court 
(referred to as ‘A’ Court and ‘B’ court in the 2011 Transitional Constitution of South Sudan 
respectively) are located at the village and payam levels. Both courts utilize customary laws in 
dispute resolution. The “B” Court deals with crimes ranging from theft through criminal breach of 
trust to murder resulting from tribal or sectional fighting. The “A” Court handles marriage cases, 
child custody, incest and divorce. Appeals from the Chiefs’ Court go to the Regional Court, but in 
practice, appeals from both courts go direct to Payam Court or a court higher than this. 
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The Payam Court is the lowest court in the hierarchy of formal law in South Sudan. According to 
the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (2011), a Payam is the second lowest tier of local 
government. The Payam Court comprises of three members dealing with criminal and civil cases 
as prescribed by both customary and statutory laws. The County Court placed at the county level 
(third tier) of local government, is presided over by state appointed judge. The County Court deals 
with criminal and civil cases as well as appeals from lower courts. The High Court at the national 
level in the capital city deals with criminal and civil cases except those matters related to the 
Constitution. The High Court also receives appeals from lower courts. Lastly, the Court of Appeal 
is the highest court located in the capital city and final point of appeal. It confirms capital 
punishment and may be asked to pronounce upon constitutional matters of law. It deals with 
appeals by relying on both statutory and customary laws which have been passed up through due 
process. 
3.8.5. Case: Child Custody 
 
South Sudanese single mothers (or divorcees) and women who get pregnant out of wedlock often 
lose cases whether in legal or customary courts. Worst is when the child is a girl. In the South 
Sudanese context, marriage is often sealed by payment of dowry (in form of money, cattle, goats, 
and chickens) which automatically grants fathers more rights of child custody in case of divorce, 
or death of the mother. Fathers are also granted more rights over children born out of wedlock and 
extra-marital affairs either because the mother is not ready for marriage or disagreements among 
family members of both partners that prevent them from settling as husband and wife.  
 
In addition, husbands who became step fathers after marrying a widow or a divorcee often feel 
cheated by courts. This is because the biological father of the children whose mother takes along 
to her second marriage usually refuses to pay any compensation to the step-father. Sometimes 
biological fathers deliberately refuse to take the compensation if offered. Nevertheless, efforts are 
being made by the GoSS to address the injustices that women face in the South Sudanese justice 
systems. If successful, men who engage in extra-marital affairs only for the shake of having 
children stand high chances of losing the rights they currently enjoy. Thus, the gap between 
mothers and fathers in terms of child custody rights would significantly reduce.  
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3.9.Scope and Constraints 
3.9.1. Dissolution and Establishment of Local Government 
 
Much as the conduct of this research was to a greater extent successful, a few challenges ensued. 
First among these challenges relates to the dissolution of the former local government unit (Central 
Equatoria State) within which Yei Municipality falls. These political changes cast doubts about 
the names and administrative boundaries within which the research took place. Should any changes 
happen, we should also expect changes to the names and boundaries of the three research sites 
soon or later. Nonetheless, the names Yei, Mundu and Pakula remained the same until the survey 
was completed. Thus, the research sample as well as the findings, to the best of the investigator’s 
knowledge are not affected and are therefore representative of the three locations. 
3.9.2. Limited Resources 
 
One of the major challenges to this research was lack of adequate financial support that could 
enable the researcher to go to the field and collect the data in person and do some more in-depth 
interviews with key informants. Despite this challenge, the researcher was able to identify six 
experienced research assistants – two from each of the three research sites who assisted with data 
collection. In addition, the little incentives paid to the research assistants was of particular 
importance because it facilitated their transport and communication costs, tea/water, and some 
printing/photocopying services. Thus, accelerating the rate at which the data collection process 
took place.  
 
3.9.3. Translation 
 
Translating the questionnaire from English to Kakwa/Bari and to Juba Arabic was also a problem. 
However, this problem did not seriously hinder the data collection and analysis processes because 
the main investigator is a native speaker of Kakwa, and also speaks Juba Arabic which is a 
simplified version of classical Arabic widely spoken by the people of Yei. Thus, to a greater extent, 
the data obtained and used in the analysis is reliable. To confirm the accuracy of the questionnaire 
and data, one native elderly Kakwa/Bari and one eloquent Juba Arabic speakers reviewed it and 
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recommended as easily readable ad understandable. Therefore, worries about accuracy of 
translation are minimal. 
3.9.4. Ethical issues 
 
During the time of conducting the research for this paper, the political situation in South Sudan 
was tense. Obtaining permission from the municipal administration and other lower levels of 
administration such as chiefs was a matter of jeopardizing the entire research process. During the 
civil war that broke out in December 2013 when the research took place, local authorities not only 
in Yei, but in most parts of South Sudan were by then curious about any activities taking place 
within their jurisdiction. Thus, a risky, but careful data collection process was designed to allow 
the main investigator to work directly with research assistants and respondents while maintaining 
confidentiality of the entire research project. Obtaining respondents’ consent to participate in the 
survey thus addresses any doubts about how access to the field was obtained.   
3.9.5. Distance, transport costs and sample representativeness 
 
Another anticipated challenge that was controlled is the issue of sample representativeness. 
Considering the far distance between Mundu and Pakula which are approximately twenty miles 
away from the main research site in Yei town, access to these two areas proved to be difficult due 
to transport costs and fear of insecurity. Research assistants for Pakula and Mundu lived at least 
ten miles away from the actual research site. However, this challenge was overcome by selecting 
citizens of Pakula and Mundu who are temporarily residing in any part of Yei town with frequent 
travels back home to their villages. These category of respondents were those with knowledge of 
the local dispute resolution processes in their communities. 
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4. PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 
 
4.1.Sample Description 
 
This section discusses the findings of the surveys taken during the research. Stata was used to 
generate cross-tabulations and chi-square tests as presented below in tables. Cross-tabulations and 
chi-squares are preferred for this particular analysis in order to enable the researcher establish 
whether or not there exist significant correlations between two or more variables.  
 
For convenience purposes, new variables for demographics were created. First, a variable called 
level of education was generated under which four categories emerged – tertiary, secondary, 
primary and no schooling. Similarly, a new variable called employment type was generated in 
which three categories emerged: formal, informal, and unemployed. Formal employment 
encompasses civil servants, civil society, and registered private business owners.  This category is 
termed as “formal” because these are employees who work in organized institutions (governmental 
or non-governmental), sign contracts with clear job descriptions, and have well spelled job 
descriptions. 
 
Tea makers, casual laborers like builders/porters, brick molders, and motorcycle riders (also called 
boba-boda) fall under informal employees. These are basically people whose work is either 
unregistered by the government or is on temporary basis and have no legal contracts, or any terms 
of reference. The unemployed people include rural farmers, housewives, students, and anyone who 
reported “no work.” Another variable called language was created under which respondents in Yei 
are considered to be English speakers because they were interviewed in English. The people of 
Mundu were termed as Arabic speakers while those in Pakula as Kakwa speakers. Age was 
categorized into three groups: those who were between eighteen and twenty-nine years by the end 
of the 1983-2005 civil war between Sudan and South Sudan formed one group, from thirty to 
thirty-nine years formed a second group and a third group consisted of those aged forty years and 
above. 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, is a tabular presentation and description of the sample 
demographics (that is gender, education, employment, age, and place of residence). Next is a 
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tabular presentation and discussion of venue selection according to each of the sample 
characteristics. And lastly, is a presentation of venue selection for the resolution of each dispute 
type as well as motivations for venue selection.  
4.2.Breakdown of the Research Sample 
 
Table 1. Statistical presentation of demographic characteristics 
Demographics  Total  
Place of residence   
Yei  94 (32.64%) 
Mundu 95 (32.99%) 
Pakula  99 (34.38%) 
 100.00% 
Gender   
Male  151 (52.43%) 
Female 137 (47.57%) 
 100.00% 
Level of education   
Tertiary  20 (6.99%) 
Secondary school  127 (44.41%) 
Primary school  88 (30.77%) 
No school 51 (17.83%) 
 100.00% 
Type of employment  
Formal  90 (31.47%) 
Informal  35 (12.24%) 
Unemployed 161 (56.29%) 
 100.00% 
Language   
English  94 (32.64%) 
Juba Arabic  95 (32.99%) 
Kakwa  99 (34.38%) 
 100.00% 
Age group  
18-29 136 (48.06%) 
30-39 104 (36.75%) 
40 above  43 (15.19%) 
 100.00% 
 
The table above shows a breakdown and description of respondents according to demographics. 
The percentage of people who took part in the survey in Yei is 32.64%, in Mundu is 32.99%and 
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in Pakula is 34.38%. The percentages for language are also the same as for those for the three 
locations. Slightly more males (52.43%) than females (47.57%) participated in the survey.   
 
The highest number of participants according to level of education are those people with secondary 
school attainment (44.41%). The second category is those people who have attended primary 
school (30.77%), and the third category is those individuals who have not at all attended any school 
(17.83%). Lastly, is the group of people who have attained tertiary education (6.99%). Most of the 
participants who participated in the surveys are unemployed (56.29), but ninety (31.47%) are 
formally employed while thirty-five (12.24%) others are informally employed. In terms of age 
group, those people aged between eighteen and twenty-nine years (48.06%) constitute the largest 
group. The second largest number is those people aged between thirty and thirty-nine (36.75%) 
while the third category is aged forty years and above (15.19%).  
4.3.Tables and chi-squares 
 
Table 2. Venue preference according to gender 
 Court type 
Gender   Modern  Traditional  Total 
Female    20 93 113 
Male   47 76 123 
Total 67 169 236 
Pearson χ2 (1) = 12.1888   Pr = 0.000 
 
The finding in the table above rejects the null hypothesis (H0) with Pr=0.000. This means that 
gender and venue preference are dependent. As shown above, traditional courts are more 
preferable than modern courts. In addition, women are more likely than men to go to traditional 
venues to resolve disputes. This findings are also consistent with the arguments by Dodo (2014) 
and Brickell (2015) in two ways.  
 
First, the former author argues that, to diffuse tension and social disorder, and to avoid being 
regarded as socially deviant, women turn to local chiefs when seeking solutions to marriage 
disputes. Dodo argues that marriage is often perceived as a means of resolving social conflicts in 
Chikomba district in Zambia. Brickell for his part argues that Cambodian women often report 
cases of domestic violence to traditional courts despite severity of the incidence they face. Such 
choices are based on fears that when reported to legal venues, marriages often breakdown. Thus, 
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perpetuating further suffering among poor women or divorcees who rely entirely on their husbands 
for survival and other basic needs.  
 
In Kenya, women face difficulties in negotiating land ownership rights in legal courts because they 
are either costly or  unable to pay bribes to some court officials (Henrysson et al. 2009). Poor as 
they are, women cannot afford to pay court fees and other expenses when they choose legal courts, 
lawyers, and judges. Left with no choice, most Kenyan women are forced to go to traditional courts 
hoping to find favorable solutions to their problems.  Moreover, in traditional settings it is taboo 
for women to report family issues to public or modern courts.  
 
Being the poorest section of people in society, this finding reflects women’s actual state of affairs 
in Yei and South Sudan as whole. Most often, women are harassed by their husbands, relatives 
and brothers whenever they report domestic matters to legal courts or police. Concerned about 
dignity and face-saving, men persuade women against their will to turn to traditional mechanisms. 
The logic as believed by most men is that women will avoid divorce and continue to live in their 
marriages peacefully. Nonetheless, deviance leads to divorce, shame, and being viewed as socially 
and culturally deviant.  
 
Table 3. Venue preference according to level of education 
 Court type 
Level of Education  Modern  Traditional  Total 
Tertiary education  8 8 16 
High School 32 77 109 
Primary school 21 48 69 
No School 4 36 40 
Total 65 169 234 
Pearson χ2 (3) = 10.6184   Pr = 0.014 
 
The finding reported in the table above rejects the null hypothesis (H0) and accepts an alternative 
hypothesis (Ha) with a Pr value of 0.014 showing that venue preference and of level of education 
are dependent. As seen in the table above, it is plausible to argue that less educated people with 
secondary and primary school education, and no schooling at all prefer traditional mechanisms to 
resolve their disputes while a few highly educated individuals who have attended tertiary education 
prefer modern courts. Overall, traditional courts are more preferable than modern courts.  
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Based on South Sudan’s low literacy rate (27%) reported by the census commission, this finding 
is not surprising. In fact, the number of people who have attended tertiary education as shown by 
the table is very low compared with those who attended secondary, primary school and those who 
have not attended school at all. This finding is also consistent with arguments that traditional 
dispute resolution mechanisms are less complex in terms of rules and regulations, less 
bureaucratic, and overall easy to understand compared with modern courts that favor elites (Kose 
& Beriker 2012; Wall & Beriker 2010; Pinto 2000).  
 
Yet, the limited educational levels among some court and police officials in South Sudan generates 
resentment among people towards legal justice systems thus, making  their competence 
questionable (Alfonse 2015). The militarized nature of the legal justice system in South Sudan also 
makes it undesirable. Many police officers are former guerrillas of the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army (SPLA) which is currently the national army of South Sudan. These former armed men and 
women missed the opportunity to attend school, but their service as liberators makes them to be 
maintained within the police force.  It is also arguable that police arrogance and use of harsh 
mechanisms to interrogate criminal suspects casts a negative picture among people. Moreover, 
disputants also worry about incompetence, corruption, bribery, and unexpected negative 
settlement outcomes caused by incapable lawyers, judges, magistrates and arbitrators when they 
go to legal systems (Baker & Scheye 2009; Baker 2010; Madut 2014).  
 
Table 4. Venue preference according to place of residence  
 Court type 
Place of residence  Modern   Traditional   Total 
Yei 37 42 79 
Mundu  02 66 68 
Pakula  28 61 89 
Total  67 169 236 
Pearson χ2 (2) = 35.2963Pr = 0.000 
 
As shown above, the finding in table 3 rejects the null hypothesis (H0) with Pr=0.000 showing 
that venue preference and place of residence are dependent. Precisely, traditional venues (169) are 
more preferable than modern venues (67). Thirty-seven people in Yei prefer modern venues 
compared with only two in Mundu and twenty-eight in Pakula. Distance is a key determinant of 
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venue preference as argued by Zhuang & Chen (2015). This means that the further a venue is; the 
less likely disputants will refer to (and vice versa). Further, it should be noted that respondents in 
Mundu are the furthest from Yei where legal courts are located and in more insecure areas. Thus, 
their extremely limited preference for modern venues could be due to transport difficulties as well 
as fears of traveling along insecure roads. Hence, accessibility and affordability matters to 
disputants when deciding between modern and traditional courts. Choosing traditional courts by 
respondents in Pakula and Mundu is not by coincidence as such. Moreover, insecurity, language 
and cultural differences discourage rural people in areas like Mundu and Pakula from travelling to 
urban centers where modern courts are located.  
 
This finding also brings to mind the issue of venue familiarity, morals, and cultural values, and 
how they influence disputants’ venue preference, as well as mediators’ dispute resolution strategies 
(Kose & Beriker 2012; Wall & Beriker 2010). Similarly, courts and police that are located mainly 
in urban settings often appear strange to rural disputants. The new encounter with lawyers, judges, 
and magistrates can be intimidating to a villager who has never seen how or what a court setup 
looks like, and how people behave during court proceedings.  
 
Another argument to substantiate the finding shown by the table above also relates to the issue of 
legality of justice systems. For urban people in Yei, the courts and police are better because that 
are legally recognized and have the authority to implement settlements whereas rural people often 
think that traditional courts are appropriate because they are indigenous and culturally appropriate. 
Unlike in rural areas, the rule of law and justice institutions are apparently more visible in Yei 
which is modernizing at a faster rate than her two sister neighbors, Pakula and Mundu. The huge 
presence of nongovernmental organizations including the United Nations Police (also known as 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan or UNMISS) working on rule of law in Yei which is 
lacking in Pakula and Mundu is another reason that explains why more disputants in urban areas 
prefer modern venues than those in rural areas.    
 
Table 5. Venue preference according to language  
 Court type 
Language Modern Traditional Total 
English  37 42 79 
Arabic  2 66 68 
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Kakwa 28 61 89 
Total  67  169 236 
Pearson χ2 (2) = 35.2963   Pr = 0.000 
 
The finding in table 5 above is statistically similar to that in table 4 in that it also rejects the null 
hypothesis (H0) with Pr=0.000. However, the explanation differs. While table 4 presents venue 
preference according to place of residence, table 5 presents a finding of venue preference according 
to language. The finding shows that language and venue preference are dependent. Since the 
survey was conducted in three different languages – in English in Yei, Arabic in Mundu, and 
Kakwa/Bari in Pakula, the analysis here is therefore based on how language influences disputants’ 
venue selection strategies.  
 
Since most people in Yei are familiar with all the three languages (see site description in page 30), 
it is not surprising to see people choosing both modern and traditional mechanisms to resolve their 
disputes. For those people who speak Arabic in Mundu, their only best choices are traditional 
venues such as chiefs, elders, and religious leaders. In addition, those people who prefer modern 
venues like court and police are most likely to be people who are either literate or live in 
metropolitan settings and understand all or at least two of the languages spoken in Yei.  
 
The fact that English is South Sudan’s official language and is commonly spoken in courts and 
police than in traditional venues can also be said to have an influence on venue preference (GoSS 
2011). Notwithstanding, the appropriate venues according to Arabic and Kakwa speakers are 
traditional courts while those who speak and/or understand English prefer modern courts. The least 
group of disputants who prefer modern courts are therefore Arabic speakers with only two 
respondents while twenty-eighty Kakwa speakers and thirty-seven English speakers respectively 
prefer modern courts.  
 
Table 6. Venue preference according age group 
 Court type  
Age Modern Traditional Total 
18-29 35 75 110 
30-39 27 64 82 
40 above 2 28 57 
Total  64 167 231 
Pearson χ2(2) = 7.7340 Pr = 0.021 
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The finding in table 6 rejects the null hypothesis (H0) with Pr=0.021. This means that age and 
venue preference are dependent. Although the overall finding indicates that traditional courts are 
more preferable than modern courts, young people aged between eighteen and twenty-nine years 
(35) tend to rely more on modern courts followed by those between thirty and thirty-nine (27) 
while only two others of forty years and above prefer modern courts. The finding further 
corresponds to Pinto’s argument that young people prefer legal dispute resolution processes while 
old people align with traditional mechanisms administered by chiefs, religious leaders, and elders 
(Pinto 2000).  
 
As shown in the table, more young people (75) aged between eighteen and twenty-nine, and thirty 
and thirty-nine (64) prefer traditional courts. The age group from forty years and above (28) people 
prefer traditional courts. This finding is surprising because for elders in South Sudan, traditional 
courts are more preferable than modern courts which the youths align with (Baker & Scheye 2009; 
Deng 2013; Jok et al. 2004). Pinto also argues that young and educated individuals are more 
comfortable with modern mechanisms of dispute resolution. This is because either the education 
to which they are introduced enables them to obtain a better understanding of legal dispute 
resolution processes or it is the media that socializes them into modern ways of life including 
dispute resolution mechanisms. Based on this argument, the finding that more young and educated 
people than elders prefer traditional venues are vulnerable to criticism.  
 
Table 7. Venue preference according to dispute type 
 Court type Total 
Dispute Type Modern   Traditional    
Civil  17 82 99 
Economic  24 50 74 
Criminal 20 15 35 
Total 61 147 208 
Pearson χ2(2) = 20.4674   Pr = 0.000 
 
The information shown by the table above rejects the null hypothesis (H0) with Pr=0.000. This 
means that dispute type and venue preference are dependent. Comparatively, modern courts (20) 
are more preferable than traditional courts (15) in resolving criminal cases. Hence, the more severe 
a dispute is, the more likely disputants will seek for the help of more powerful and competent 
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courts. Similarly, less severe disputes will be referred to traditional venues where settlement 
outcomes are non-binding and aimed at reconciliation. Those respondents who prefer traditional 
courts to resolve civil and economic cases are possibly interested in non-binding settlements 
especially if the dispute is less contentious. This means that disputants are interested in seeing that 
they both win rather than lose.  
 
In the South Sudanese context, crimes such as armed robbery, murder by gun or any other weapon 
or slaughter often go to court or police (Ministry of Jusitce 2008). It is a constitutional provision 
that since the court and police have the leverage and authority to make binding and enforceable 
decisions, it is better for such severe disputes to be resolved by legal justice systems rather than 
weak traditional mechanisms. Similarly, the fact that traditional mechanisms lack enforcement 
capabilities and are less experienced in resolving cases such as murder where victims expect justice 
as the ultimate goal of the resolution process makes them to be less preferred. In isolated cases 
however, local chiefs and elders assist disputants to resolve murder. Such situations include those 
where death was/is caused by cursing a thief or murderer. Consider the case below based on the 
author’s account of how theft cases are handled in Yei. 
 
When a thief steals someone’s money, the owner institutes some cultural mechanisms in order to 
induce fear in the thief to return the money. In such situations, if the thief experiences certain 
unforeseen catastrophes including death, it may be concluded that the cultural measures are 
successful. In this situation, members of the two families sit down and try to resolve the issue 
because the reason for the death is already known: theft for which there is no need of going to a 
lawyer, judge, or magistrate.   
 
Moreover, the deceased’s family in this particular case has no any legitimate right to demand 
compensation from the owner of the money since their fellow committed an unlawful act that is 
punishable by law. Cases like theft make disputants to opt for traditional venues despite severity 
of the dispute. Nonetheless, highly contentious issues are resolved by legal courts that possess 
sufficient leverage, enforcement capability and expertise capable of persuading disputants towards 
making binding decisions aimed at preventing conflict recurrence.  
 
 
 
 47 
 
Table 8. Venue preference for resolving fight 
 Court type Total 
 Modern Traditional  
Gender 
Female  2 131 133 
Male  8 140 148 
Total  10 271 281 
Pearson χ2 (1) = 3.1070 Pr = 0.078 
Education  
Tertiary education  1 17 18 
High School 8 116 124 
Primary school 1 87 88 
No School 0 49 49 
Total  10 269 279 
Pearson χ2 (3) = 6.5000 Pr = 0.090 
Location  
Yei 4 85 89 
Mundu  1 92 93 
Pakula   5 94 99 
Total  10 271 281 
Pearson χ2 (2) = 2.5402 Pr = 0.281 
Language   
English  4 85 89 
Arabic 1 92 93 
Kakwa  5 94 99 
Total  10 271 281 
Pearson χ2 (2) = 2.5402 Pr = 0.281 
Age  
18- 5 129 134 
18-30 3 97 100 
31 above  2 40 42 
Total  10 266 276 
Pearson χ2 (2) = 0.2717 Pr = 0.873 
Employment    
Formal  5 79 134 
Informal  2 33 100 
Unemployed  3 157 42 
Total  10 269 279 
Pearson χ2 (2) = 3.1753 Pr = 0.204 
Motivation Modern  Traditional  Total  
Norms and values 7 84 91 
Venue characteristics 3 70 73 
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Practicality  0 102 102 
Total  10 256 266 
Pearson chiχ2 (2) = 7.8995 Pr = 0.019 
 
As shown in table 8 above, the data shows statistically insignificant correlations between venue 
preference and all the six demographic characteristics with P>0.05. Despite this finding, the data 
does not indicate whether or not venue preference is dependent on gender, level of education, place 
of residence, language, age, and employment type. Notwithstanding, traditional courts are more 
preferable than modern courts regardless of all demographic characteristics. Specifically, more 
males (140) than females (131), less educated than more educated, and unemployed than employed 
people prefer traditional to modern courts.  In addition, the data also shows significant correlation 
between motivating factors and venue preference with Pr=0.019 which is less than the significance 
level set at P<0.05. One of the over-riding motivating factors for selection of traditional courts is 
practicality (102) followed by norms and values (84) and lastly, venue characteristics (70). 
 
Cases such as fight or quarrel between two people in the South Sudanese context are often 
perceived as less contentious and their resolution is also assumed to take place at the local level 
with the help of informal conflict resolvers like chiefs and guards at the water wells. Based on 
traditionally acquired knowledge, chiefs are often viewed as qualified, competent and experienced 
people in resolving local disputes (Jok et al. 2004; Deng 2013). Consider a brief explanation of a 
case based on the author’s personal experience where the role of guards is crucial in resolving 
disputes in Yei which is an urban setting6. 
 
In Yei, water points or wells are often hot spots for disputes. To resolve emerging disputes, some 
men assume the role of managers or guards to oversee issues pertaining to the use of water 
facilities. At the same time, these managers help to resolve any disputes among women that result 
from scramble over water. The role this category of people play in dispute resolution is not 
constitutionally defined, but locally, they are perceived as capable of handling local disputes.  
 
                                                          
6 This case is based on personal account of the author who has ever witnessed several cases of fight at water wells in 
Yei town during his internship between the months of July and August, 2015 before the surveys were undertaken. 
Because the author resides in Yei, and the fact that there is a water well near his homestead, he was able to witness 
such cases. 
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Further, when disputes arise at the water wells and destruction of water containers or injuries take 
place, the managers usually act in a manner similar to that of judges or court officials. This is 
because the aim is to make sure that whoever causes a destructive fight takes responsibility and 
compensates any losses incurred. For instance, managers often ensure that whoever is found guilty 
first compensates the opponent whose water container is broken during a fight. Non-compliance 
implies suspension from fetching water from the particular water well where the fighting occurs. 
In this sense, conflict managers act as arbitrators or adjudicators who make binding and final 
judgments on both parties. Nevertheless, these kinds of settlements are not binding because most 
of them are not officially written. That is to say, they are simply discussed and agreed to verbally 
without the disputants having to sign any paper. Moreover, the ultimate goal of dispute resolution 
is to discipline disputants never to repeat the same mistake and learn to peacefully co-exist at the 
water wells. 
 
Table 9. Venue preference for resolving child custody 
 Court type Total 
 Modern Traditional  
Gender    
Female  7 127 134 
Male  7 143 150 
Total 14 270 284 
Pearson χ2 (1) = 0.0469 Pr = 0.829 
Education  
Tertiary education  4 15 19 
High School 6 118 124 
Primary school 3 85 88 
No School 1 50 51 
Total  14 268 282 
Pearson χ2 (3) = 11.8538 Pr = 0.008 
Location  
Yei  11 80 91 
Mundu 2 93 95 
Pakula  1 97 98 
Total  14 270 284 
Pearson χ2 (2) = 14.7622 Pr = 0.001 
Language  
English  11 80 91 
Arabic 2 93 95 
Kakwa 1 97 98 
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Total  14 270 284 
Pearson χ2 (2) = 14.7622 Pr = 0.001 
Age  
18- 9 124 133 
18-30 4 99 103 
31 above  1 42 43 
Total  14 265 279 
Pearson χ2 (2) = 1.7857 Pr = 0.409 
Employment 
Formal  6 81 87 
Informal  4 31 35 
Unemployed  4 156 160 
Total  14 268 282 
Pearson χ2 (2) = 5.8477 Pr = 0.054 
 Modern  Traditional  Total  
Motivation 
Norms and values 1 89 90 
Venue characteristics 4 69 73 
Practicality  9 98 107 
Total  14 256 270 
Pearson chiχ2 (2) = 5.3164 = 0.070 
 
To understand how child custody cases are resolved, respondents were asked which venues they 
prefer and why. As shown in the table above, the data rejects the null hypotheses (H0) that venue 
preference, level of education, place of residence and language are independent with P<0.05. On 
the other hand, the data fails to show any significant correlation between venue preference, gender, 
age, and employment type with P>0.05. This finding shows that when deciding over court type, 
gender, age, and employment type do not matter whereas level of education, place of residence, 
and language have an influence on disputants’ decision-making processes for conflict resolution 
venues.  
 
Traditional venues are particularly more preferable than modern courts irrespective of all 
demographic characteristics. Moreover, slightly more men (143) than women (127) prefer 
traditional venues and an equal number (7) prefer modern courts. Although the data shows that 
there is no significant correlation between venue preference and the motivating factors with 
P=0.070, practicality (98) happens to be the most influential factor influencing the choice of 
traditional courts followed by norms and values (89) and venue characteristics (69) being the last.  
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Although child custody is a contested issue among couples and family members in South Sudan, 
traditional venues take precedence over modern mechanisms in resolving rivalry over children in 
the aftermath of divorce, death, and in cases where a child is born out of wedlock and marriage 
could not take place. This is because people often worry that when taken to court or police, the 
outcomes to a great extent favor one side (Jok et al. 2004; Deng 2013). This means that the husband 
wins the case especially if dowry was paid in full, or if the wife committed adultery and is seeking 
another marriage. In most South Sudanese cultures, though now disappearing, upon death of either 
husband or wife, the marriage relationship between the two families breaks down and the uncles’ 
rights over their nephews also start to diminish.  
 
The decision to grant fathers full rights over children has recently become a common phenomenon 
among traditional conflict resolvers in South Sudan. This is because some chiefs are being 
introduced to legal laws through trainings by local NGOs and CSOs.  This shift in conflict 
management empowers traditional conflict managers with legally binding mechanisms that are 
less admired in traditional settings where interdependence, peace, harmony, and reconciliation are 
vital (Wall & Beriker 2010; Kose & Beriker 2012; Celik & Shkreli 2010; Pinto 2000; Steinberg 
2000). Thus, it is not surprising that few people prefer modern mechanisms such as police and 
court to resolve child custody cases whereas majority prefer traditional mechanisms as illustrated 
by the table.  
 
In addition, cultures such as the South African Ubuntu which is also prevalent in most African 
settings hinder individuals from seeking modern mechanisms. Ubuntu is basically a culture where 
an individual’s survival and well-being depend on his/her close attachment to collective societal 
norms and values. In such societies where survival is based on interdependence and compliance 
with established norms and traditions, referring to legal and binding mechanisms of dispute 
resolution implies defiance and disrespect (see Conteh 2014; Brickell 2015). In fact, some cultures 
among the people of Yei do not entertain total ownership of children by a single parent. Rather, 
with the help of clan or family members, disputants discuss ways of how to jointly take care of 
children whose mother is either dead, or has ventured into another marriage (Jok et al. 2004; Deng 
2013). Some interesting responses from the survey such as “the child belongs to both”, “the child 
belongs to the community” and “it’s a family issue” imply that solving child custody is not a public 
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event. Therefore, traditional dispute resolution constitutes part of the local cultures in South Sudan, 
and is the most preferred as shown by the research findings in the table. 
 
Table 10. Venue selection for resolving road accidents 
 Court type Total 
 Modern Traditional  
Gender 
Female  96 35 131 
Male  114 26 140 
Total 210 61 271 
Pearson χ2 (1) = 2.5747 Pr = 0.109 
Education  
Tertiary education  19 1 20 
High School 101 18 119 
Primary school 61 21 82 
No School 27 21 84 
Total  208 61 269 
Pearson χ2 (3) = 19.9924 Pr = 0.000 
Location  
Yei  79 7 86 
Mundu 46 43 89 
Pakula  85 11 96 
Total  210 61 271 
Pearson χ2(2) = 50.8803 Pr = 0.000 
Language  
English  79 7 86 
Arabic 46 43 89 
Kakwa 85 11 96 
Total  210 61 271 
Pearson χ2(2) = 50.8803 Pr = 0.000 
Age  
18-29 112 15 127 
30-39 66 33 99 
40 above  28 12 40 
Total  206 60 266 
Pearson χ2 (2) = 16.2454 Pr = 0.000 
Employment 
Formal  72 14 86 
Informal  28 3 31 
Unemployed  108 44 152 
Total  208 61 269 
Pearson χ2 (2) = 8.4036 Pr = 0.015 
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 Modern  Traditional  Total  
Motivation 
Norms and values 63 22 85 
Venue characteristics 57 13 70 
Practicality  82 20 102 
Total  202 55 257 
Pearson chiχ2 (2) = 1.5430 Pr = 0.462 
 
The test statistics in the table above reject the null hypotheses (H0) that venue preference, 
education, location, language, age, and employment type are independent with P<0.05. This 
finding means that venue preference is dependent on all the five demographic features mentioned 
above. Nonetheless, the data shows insignificant correlation between venue preference and gender 
with Pr=0.109.  
 
Overall, modern courts are more preferable than traditional courts in resolving road accidents. 
Males (114) are particularly more likely than females (96) to refer to modern courts to resolve 
traffic accidents. Similarly, more females (35) than males (26) prefer traditional to modern courts. 
It is however, unusual to have a high number of people (85) in Pakula which is remote with no 
traffic accidents preferring modern to traditional courts. This kind of finding is irrelevant because 
in rural areas like Pakula and Mundu, there are relatively fewer motor vehicles and road networks 
than in Yei which is Urban with more traffic.  
 
The data in the table also shows that there is significant correlation between venue selection and 
the motivating factors outlined above because Pr=0.0462. The finding also shows that practicality 
(82) is the over-riding motivating factor for selection of modern courts while venue characteristics 
(57) is the least motivating factor. Nonetheless, it is unusual to find out that some respondents state 
norms and values (63) as their main motivating factors for selecting modern courts to resolve 
traffic accidents which is not supported by the literature on forum shopping. Rather, Western-
oriented literature on conflict resolution maintains that culture is not important in venue selection.  
 
The literature reviewed for this paper on venue selection strategies for highly salient issues shows 
that when disputants expect material gains and are concerned about fairness, and speed of 
resolution,  they prefer legal courts (see Belge & Blaydes 2013). In this case, modern courts are 
perceived as competent, and have the leverage and enforcement capability to fulfill disputants’ 
expectations. Modern courts are therefore perceived as suitable venues for resolving road accidents 
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because they are capable of making fair judgments based on expertise on traffic rules. Moreover, 
legal courts and police are capable of arresting and detaining culprits if found guilty of violating 
traffic rules. For the few people who prefer traditional venues such as chiefs, elders, and religious 
leaders to resolve accidents, it can be argued that there are no police or courts in the areas where 
they live such as Pakula and Mundu.  
 
Table 11. Venue selection for resolving debt cases 
 Court type Total 
 Modern Traditional  
Gender 
Female  37 95 132 
Male  46 100 146 
Total 83 195 278 
Pearson χ2 (1) = 0.4001 Pr = 0.527 
Education  
Tertiary education  9 10 19 
High School 48 75 123 
Primary school 23 62 85 
No School 3 46 49 
Total  83 193 276 
Pearson χ2 (3) = 21.1229 Pr = 0.000 
Location  
Yei  41 46 87 
Mundu 10 84 94 
Pakula  32 65 97 
Total  83 195 278 
Pearson χ2(2) = 29.4228 Pr = 0.000 
Language  
English  41 46 87 
Arabic 10 84 94 
kakwa 32 65 97 
Total  83 195 278 
Pearson χ2 (2) = 29.4228 Pr = 0.000 
Age  
18-29 50 79 129 
30-39 27 74 101 
40 above  5 38 43 
Total  82 191 273 
Pearson χ2 (2) = 12.1298 Pr = 0.002 
Employment 
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Formal  27 60 87 
Informal  9 24 33 
Unemployed  47 109 156 
Total  83 193 276 
Pearson χ2(2) = 0.1615 Pr = 0.922 
 Modern  Traditional  Total  
Motivation 
Norms and values 20 68 88 
Venue characteristics 26 44 70 
Practicality  31 74 105 
Total  77 186 263 
Pearson chiχ2 (2) = 3.9180 Pr = 0.141 
 
Table 11 shows that the null hypotheses (H0) for independence between venue preference and 
level of education, place of residence, language, and age are rejected by P<0.05. This means that 
there exists significant correlation between venue preference and all the demographic features 
mentioned above. Therefore, an alternative hypothesis (Ha) stressing relationship between venue 
preference and the four demographic features should be accepted. On the other hand, the data 
shows insignificant correlation between venue preference, gender, and employment type with 
P>0.05 meaning that gender and employment type have nothing to do with venue selection for 
resolving debt cases.  
 
The data also shows insignificant correlation between venue selection and the three motivating 
factors with Pr=0.141 which is greater than the significance level set at P<0.05. Nonetheless, a 
large number of respondents (74) claim that practicality plays a crucial role in the selection of 
traditional courts. The second most important factor that influences preference of traditional courts 
is norms and values (68) while the least is venue characteristics (44).  
 
As a matter of fact, traditional courts lack leverage to enforce resolutions in dealing with 
contentious economic disputes like debt that involve huge sums of money. For instance, chiefs or 
elders do not have the necessary inducements to persuade a resistant party to concede. Neither are 
they able to threaten defiant parties. This finding also casts doubt on whether or not those who 
prefer traditional to modern courts are consciously aware of their decisions. For instance, 
unemployed young male people in rural areas would in fact prefer legal mechanisms to settle their 
debt issues with an expectation of compensation or recovering their money.  
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The resolution of debt cases in Yei is often viewed as complete after compensation is done for 
creditors or imprisonment of a bad debtor. Hence, it is noteworthy to argue that debt cases are 
better resolved by modern courts. While a creditor’s interest is in recovering his or her money, a 
debtor’s interest is often that of avoiding jail among other measures that might be taken by the 
creditor. This competitive and divergent interest-based conflict resolution often leads disputants 
to disagree on traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution.  
 
Interest incompatibility also tends to perpetuate tension and distrust between disputants who 
eventually opt for legal mechanisms. As shown by the finding in the table above, most debt cases 
are resolved by traditional courts which ought not to be the case according to the literature on 
forum shopping for salient issues. Nonetheless, the amount of debt, and how such a problem is 
approached matters in the decision-making process for venue selection. It should also be noted 
that only major debt cases are resolved by modern courts while minor ones are resolved by 
traditional courts.  
 
Table 12. Venue preference for resolving land disputes  
 Court type Total 
 Modern Traditional  
Gender 
Female  19 117 136 
Male  34 114 148 
Total 53 231 284 
Pearson χ2 (1) = 3.7840 Pr = 0.052 
Education  
Tertiary education  3 17 20 
High School 16 100 126 
Primary school 15 71 86 
No School 9 41 50 
Total  53 229 282 
Pearson χ2 (3) = 0.5921 Pr = 0.898 
Location  
Yei  24 70 94 
Mundu 11 81 92 
Pakula  18 80 98 
Total  53 231 284 
Pearson χ2(2) = 5.6535 Pr = 0.059 
Language  
English  24 70 94 
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Arabic 11 81 92 
kakwa 18 80 98 
Total  53 231 284 
Pearson χ2(2) = 5.6535 Pr = 0.059 
Age  
18-29 25 110 135 
30-39 19 83 102 
40 above  8 34 42 
Total  52 227 279 
Pearson χ2 (2) = 0.0059 Pr = 0.997 
Employment 
Formal  14 76 90 
Informal  8 26 34 
Unemployed  31 127 158 
Total  53 227 282 
Pearson χ2 (2) = 1.1887 Pr = 0.552 
 Modern  Traditional  Total  
Motivation 
Norms and values 19 70 89 
Venue characteristics 12 61 73 
Practicality  20 88 108 
Total  51 219 270 
Pearson chiχ2 (2) = 0.6472 Pr = 0.724 
 
The finding as shown in the table above is not surprising because of the land dynamics in Yei and 
South Sudan as a whole. The data shows insignificant correlations between venue preference, 
gender, level of education, place of residence, language, age, and employment type. This means 
that all of the five demographic characteristics have no influence on decision-making over court 
type for resolving land disputes. Traditional mechanisms are of particular preference to disputants 
faced with land disputes. Further, no significant correlation exists between venue selection and the 
three motivating factors as Pr=0.724. In spite of this finding, the data shows that practicality (88) 
is a crucial factor in choosing traditional over modern venues, norms and values (70) are the second 
most influential while venue characteristics (61) are least. 
 
Land ownership and land acquisition in South Sudan is well articulated both in the Land Act and 
2011 Transitional Constitution of South Sudan. The constitution states that land belongs to the 
people and the government plays a regulatory role such that no tensions arise (The Land Act 2009). 
Every citizen is entitled to own land as long as he or she is a member of a particular community. 
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One of the most common causes of conflicts in South Sudan is illegal land sale and/or acquisition 
and land grabbing mostly by cattle keepers as well as powerful and rich people.  
 
The government’s primary roles, particularly that of the land commission and local land tribunals 
is to ensure that conflicts over land do not arise, and if they do, they are managed amicably without 
escalating to violence (Heegde et. al 2011; The Land Act 2009). Further, the belief and tradition 
among South Sudanese people particularly local chiefs and elders that land ownership is ancestral 
tends to attach value to the role of traditional leaders in land dispute resolution. The fact that chiefs 
and elders are more aware about land boundaries and ownership gives them the leverage to make 
decisions that facilitate compensation for grabbed land. Hence, in most land dispute resolution 
processes, the ultimate goal is to ensure that any illegally acquired land is returned to the owner or 
compensated with an exact piece of land elsewhere. 
 
The increase in land grabbing cases by armed people and some powerful government officials in 
most parts of South Sudan has recently prompted people to express lack of confidence in legal 
justice systems in resolving land disputes. This lack of confidence and distrust result from alleged 
corruption, bribery and incompetence (Alfonse 2015). In addition, the loss of trust and confidence 
are allegedly fueled by reluctance by legal justice institutions to immediately resolve land cases. 
Nonetheless, traditional courts still retain people’s confidence and trust that any grabbed land can 
be compensated. 
 
Table 13. Venue preference for resolving theft 
 Court type Total 
 Modern Traditional  
Gender   
Female  64 66 130 
Male  71 72 143 
Total 135 138 273 
Pearson χ2 (1) =0.0048   Pr = 0.945 
Education  
Tertiary education  12 7 19 
High School 70 51 121 
Primary school 38 46 84 
No School 14 34 48 
Total  134 138 272 
Pearson χ2(3) = 13.3386   Pr = 0.004 
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Location  
Yei  54 33 87 
Mundu 16 75 91 
Pakula  65 30 95 
Total  135 138 273 
Pearson χ2(2) = 56.1903   Pr = 0.000 
Language  
English  54 33 87 
Arabic 16 75 91 
Kakwa 65 30 95 
Total  135 138 273 
Pearson χ2(2) = 56.1903 Pr = 0.000 
Age  
18- 77 50 127 
18-30 42 56 98 
31 above  15 28 43 
Total  134 134 268 
Pearson χ2 (2) = 11.6704 Pr = 0.003 
Employment 
Formal  46 39 85 
Informal  16 15 31 
Unemployed  72 84 156 
Total  134 138 272 
Pearson χ2(2) = 1.4733 Pr = 0.479 
 Modern  Traditional  Total  
Motivation 
Norms and values 43 41 84 
Venue characteristics 32 40 72 
Practicality  52 50 102 
Total  127 131 258 
Pearson chiχ2 (2) = 0.9139 Pr = 0.633 
 
The data in the table above shows a significant correlation between venue preference, level of 
education, location, language and age thus, rejecting the null hypotheses (H0) with P<0.05. On the 
other hand, the data shows insignificant correlation between venue preference, gender and 
employment type with P>0.05. Traditional venues are slightly more preferable than modern courts. 
Interestingly, almost an equal number of respondents prefer both modern and traditional courts for 
resolving theft cases. In addition, the data shows insignificant correlation between venue selection 
and all the three motivations listed in the table with Pr=0.633 which is greater than the significance 
level set to be 0.05. Contrary to this finding, respondents identify practicality (52) as the most 
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influential factor for choosing modern over traditional courts. Similarly, norms and values (43) are 
the second most influential factors for choosing modern over traditional courts while venue 
characteristics (40) are influential in choosing traditional over modern courts.  
 
Theft is a criminal offense punishable by law according to the South Sudan Criminal Code (2008). 
In situations where a thief is caught while stealing in public, the police often intervene directly 
thus, preventing free choice over court types for resolution. In spite of this hindrance, in rural areas 
where police are either absent or inaccessible, disputants refer to local chiefs and elders. In order 
to prevent mob justice, police intervene with an aim to rescue thieves by dispersing wild crowds 
and taking or locking them up in prison cells to be later arraigned either in court or police for 
interrogation. As discussed in the literature review in chapter three, criminal offenses fall under 
highly salient issues for which their resolution requires venues with expertise, leverage and 
enforcement capability (Powell & Wiegand 2014).    
 
In South Sudan, the tendency by people accused of, and charged with theft to delay compensating 
property owners is prevalent. As such, people whose property is stolen often turn to the police who 
are perceived as the right venues capable of making favorable, binding, and enforceable decisions 
competently. Fearing long-term prison sentences and public shame/humiliation, thieves often 
attempt to escape, thus prompting intervention by police either voluntarily or upon request. 
Although the reasons given by respondents are varied and not specific, some responses obtained 
from the survey such as “the police are powerful”, “they are strong”, “they know how to resolve 
theft cases”, and “they can arrest and imprison thieves” that were all coded as competent and 
favorable obviously informed the respondents’ decisions to choose modern courts to resolve theft 
cases. 
 
Table 14. Venue preference for resolving rape or defilement 
 Court type Total 
 Modern Traditional  
Gender   
Female  100 35 135 
Male  116 34 150 
Total 216 69 285 
Pearson χ2 (1) = 0.4113 Pr = 0.521 
Education  
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Tertiary education  15 4 19 
High School 109 17 126 
Primary school 60 28 88 
No School 30 20 50 
Total  214 69 283 
Pearson χ2(3) = 17.4732 Pr = 0.001 
Location  
Yei  82 10 92 
Mundu 44 50 94 
Pakula  90 9 99 
Total  216 69 285 
Pearson χ2(2) 64.2847 Pr = 0.000 
Language  
English  82 10 92 
Arabic 44 50 94 
Kakwa 90 9 99 
Total  216 69 285 
Pearson χ2(2) 64.2847 Pr = 0.000 
Age  
18-29 114 20 134 
30-39 72 31 103 
40 above  26 17 43 
Total  212 68 280 
Pearson χ2(2) = 13.7146Pr = 0.001 
Employment 
Formal  69 18 87 
Informal  29 6 35 
Unemployed  116 45 161 
Total  214 69 282 
Pearson χ2(2) = 2.7501 Pr = 0.253 
 Modern  Traditional  Total  
Motivation 
Norms and values 68 23 91 
Venue characteristics 57 16 73 
Practicality  80 26 106 
Total  205 65 270 
Pearson chiχ2 (2) = 0.2694 Pr = 0.874 
 
As illustrated in the table above, the null hypotheses (H0) that venue preference, education, place 
of residence, language, and age are independent are all rejected with P<0.05. Therefore, the data 
shows significant correlations between venue preference and all of the demographic features listed 
above. On the other hand, the data fails to show any significant correlation between gender and 
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employment type with P>0.05. This means that when deciding over venues, gender and 
employment type do not matter while level of education, place of residence, language, and age do. 
In addition, there is no significant correlation between motivating factors and venue selection since 
Pr=0.874 which is greater than 0.05. The data also shows that modern courts are preferred to 
traditional courts for resolving rape and defilement cases.   
 
Practicality (80) highly influences disputants’ selection of modern courts. Norms and values (68) 
are second while venue characteristics (57) are third in influencing disputants’ preference of 
modern courts. This finding is unsurprising since the literature on venue selection by Lefler (2015) 
maintains that modern courts are suitable for resolving contentious issues in which rape and 
defilement in the South Sudanese context are part. Although the overall finding reveals modern 
courts as the ultimate venues for resolving rape and defilement, the people of Mundu boma prefer 
traditional courts while modern courts are preferred in Yei and Pakula.   
 
At the time of conducting this research a man was convicted of, and sentenced to fourteen-years 
imprisonment for defiling a child7. Resolving such complex cases requires more competent and 
powerful venues that possess leverage to enforce binding settlements. Perhaps, the perception of 
modern venues like police as suitable for resolving rape and defilement can be attributed to the 
improvement in the legal justice system in Yei by organizations such as UNMISS or UN Police. 
Moreover, a number of non-governmental organizations like South Sudan Law Society (SSLS) are 
helping to improve the legal justice systems in Yei and South Sudan as whole, all of which can be 
attributed to the preference of modern courts in resolving rape and defilement cases. These two 
organizations also provide training on the rule of law and law enforcement to police and court 
officials so as to enhance their capacities.  
 
Nonetheless, in rare cases and in some particular cultures where rape and defilement are not 
perceived as criminal offenses, traditional conflict managers usually assume the responsibility of 
resolving them. Moreover, most cases of rape and defilement end up as marriage between the rape 
or defilement victim and rapist or defiler (see Dodo 2014 for marriage as a way to resolve social 
conflicts). It should also be noted that informal conflict resolvers only become involved when 
                                                          
7https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/yei-man-receives-14-year-prison-sentence-raping-child 
 63 
 
disagreements arise particularly after a rapist or defiler attempts to escape or refuses to take 
responsibility for the incident.  
 
Table 15. Venue selection for resolving murder 
 Court type Total 
 Modern Traditional  
Gender 
Female  131 6 137 
Male  136 14 150 
Total 267 20 287 
Pearson χ2(1) =2.7103   Pr = 0.100 
Education  
Tertiary education  19 1 20 
High School 119 7 126 
Primary school 80 8 88 
No School 47 4 51 
Total 265 20 285 
Pearson χ2(3) = 1.1705 Pr = 0.760 
Location  
Yei  90 3 93 
Mundu 85 10 95 
Pakula  92 7 287 
Total  267 20 287 
Pearson χ2(2) = 3.8659 Pr = 0.145 
Language  
English  90 3 93 
Arabic 85 10 95 
kakwa 92 7 287 
Total  267 20 287 
Pearson χ2(2) = 3.8659 Pr = 0.145 
Age 
18-29 128 7 135 
30-39 96 8 104 
40 above  38 5 43 
Total  262 20 282 
Pearson χ2(2) = 2.1445 Pr = 0.342 
Employment 
Formal  84 6 90 
Informal  33 1 34 
Unemployed  148 13 161 
Total  265 20 285 
Pearson χ2(2) = 1.1585 Pr = 0.560 
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 Modern  Traditional  Total  
Motivation 
Norms and values 85 6 91 
Venue characteristics 67 6 73 
Practicality  101 7 108 
Total  253 19 272 
Pearson chiχ2 (2) = 0.2348 Pr = 0.889 
 
The data in table 15 above does not show any significant correlations between venue preference 
and all of the five demographic characteristics because P>0.05. Despite this finding, the data shows 
that modern courts are preferable to traditional mechanisms across all the demographic 
characteristics. In addition, there is no significant correlation between venue selection and all the 
motivating factors because Pr=0.0889 which is greater than 0.05. The data also shows that 
practicality (101) is highly influential than norms and values (85) and venue characteristics (67) 
respectively in informing disputants’ selection of modern over traditional courts. This finding is 
consistent with the literature on forum shopping by Lefler (2015) which argues that highly 
contentious issues such as murder are better resolved by legal courts with an aim to arrive at 
enforceable and binding settlements. Therefore, although disputants prefer modern courts, their 
demographic characteristics do not influence their decisions.  
 
The finding in the table implies that murder is a criminal case for which the law in South Sudan 
recommends legal justice systems to deal with. When asked the question: “When somebody you 
know is murdered, and you are affected by it, who do you go to and resolve such a problem, and 
why? – responses such as “it’s a police case”, “it’s their responsibility”, and “such that the killer 
is arrested and jailed” were obtained. All of these responses substantiate the finding shown in the 
table. Based on this argument, the resolution of murder as a criminal offence to a greater extent 
requires legal instruments. 
 
Although the 2008 South Sudan Criminal Law and Penal Code both classify murder as a serious 
crime only resolvable by legal means, in exceptional situations murder cases are referred to 
traditional venues for resolution. Consider the case below based on the author’s personal 
observation of events in his life in Yei. The scenario as I explain is also reflected in the cultures 
and traditions of the people of Yei. In South Sudan, cases where the chiefs’ intervention is required 
include those related to death resulting from sorcery or witchcraft, or any sort of cultural factor 
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leading to an individual’s death. Sometimes if the death is unintentional, disputants agree on non-
binding resolution whereby family members, elders, clan leaders, and influential individuals 
discuss ways of compensation, cleansing and reconciliation.  
 
Table 16. Venue preference for adultery and elopement 
 Court type Total 
 Modern Traditional  
Gender 
Female  37 87 124 
Male  75 67 142 
Total 112 154 266 
Pearson χ2(1) = 14.3379 Pr = 0.000 
Education  
Tertiary education  9 8 17 
High School 52 61 113 
Primary school 42 43 85 
No School 9 41 50 
Total  112 153 265 
Pearson χ2(3) = 15.2900 Pr = 0.002 
Location  
Yei  34 44 78 
Mundu 26 66 92 
Pakula  52 44 96 
Total  112 154 226 
Pearson χ2(2) = 13.0334 Pr = 0.001 
Language  
English  34 44 78 
Arabic 26 66 92 
Kakwa 52 44 96 
Total  112 154 226 
Pearson χ2(2) = 13.0334 Pr = 0.001 
Age  
18-29 54 68 122 
30-39 40 58 98 
40 above  14 28 42 
Total  108 154 262 
Pearson χ2(2) = 1.5508 Pr = 0.461 
Employment 
Formal  37 41 78 
Informal  17 15 32 
Unemployed  58 97 155 
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Total  112 153 265 
Pearson χ2(2) = 3.8928 Pr = 0.143 
 Modern  Traditional  Total  
Motivation 
Norms and values 36 54 90 
Venue characteristics 32 33 65 
Practicality  39 57 96 
Total  107 144 251 
Pearson chiχ2 (2) = 1.5703 Pr = 0.456 
 
Table 16 presents interesting findings with almost the same number of people preferring modern 
and traditional courts simultaneously. The data shows insignificant correlations between venue 
preference, age, and employment type with P>0.05. Thus, disputant’s age and employment type 
are not important to considered when deciding over court types. On the other hand, venue 
preference, gender, level of education, place of residence, and language are significantly correlated 
with P<0.05. As such, the data rejects the null hypothesis that venue preference, gender, level of 
education, place of residence, and language are independent. As shown in the table, more males 
(75) than females (37) prefer modern courts.  Similarly, more females (87) than males (67) prefer 
traditional courts. In addition, many respondents (66) in Mundu prefer traditional to modern courts 
whereas in Pakula which is a rural setting, many people (52) prefer modern courts and is the 
opposite in Yei where forty-four people prefer traditional courts while thirty-seven others prefer 
modern courts.  
 
This kind of relatively similar finding is interesting for two reasons. First, in some contexts, 
adultery is perceived as a less contentious issue whose resolution does not require binding 
decisions. Secondly, in modernizing societies like Yei, adultery is perceived as a criminal offence 
that requires competent and powerful conflict managers who can enforce settlement decisions. 
Ideally, legal courts are preferred to deter disputants from taking the law into their hands by 
physically confronting one another (an adulterous person in most cases).  
 
Therefore, in such cultures where adultery is not so serious as criminal offense, traditional courts 
are the most preferred dispute resolution forums whereas in societies where adultery is seen as 
sinful and criminal, it is usually the police or courts that resolve the matter because they wield 
enforcement power and leverage. This finding is consistent with the cultural literature on conflict 
resolution that maintains that modern and traditional mechanisms are simultaneously applicable in 
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multicultural settings as long as mediators are sensitive to the local contexts in which they operate 
(Kose & Beriker 2012; Pinto 2000; Steinberg 2000).  
 
Further, the data shows no significant correlation between venue preference and all of the 
motivating factors with Pr=0.456 which is greater than the significance level set at P<0.05. Despite 
this statistically insignificant data, practicality (57) is the most important factor that influences 
disputants’ selection of traditional courts. Norms and values (54) take the second place while the 
least is venue characteristics (33) as a motivating factor for selection of traditional courts.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper is a result of field survey conducted over a period of one month in Yei Municipality in 
South Sudan. The main aim was to examine factors that influence venue preference for dispute 
resolution. The results are in discordant with the assertion by Western-oriented literature that 
modern dispute resolution mechanisms are applicable in multicultural settings without any 
restraints. The statistical analysis conveys traditional courts as the most preferred venue across 
gender, age, level of education, type of employment, place of residence, language, and dispute 
types. Categorically, more females than males prefer traditional courts; less educated people agree 
the traditional courts are the most suitable venues. In terms of location and language, traditional 
courts are still more preferred, and many young people compared with old people also view 
traditional courts as more suitable.  
 
Moreover, traditional courts are more preferred in resolving cases like fight, child custody, land 
disputes, and debt. Modern courts are preferred in the resolution of road accidents, theft, 
rape/defilement and murder. However, both traditional and modern courts are viewed as capable 
of resolving adultery depending on how the case is perceived in different settings. Further, 
practicality (that is, accessibility, affordability and speed of resolution) is the most influential 
factor for venue selection for resolving all of the nine disputes examined. The second most 
influential factor is norms and values and lastly, venue characteristics. This paper is a significant 
contribution to the conflict resolution literature because it offers a detailed understanding of venue 
selection processes according to specific individual disputes in modernizing societies based on 
first hand field data. It also offers in-depth analysis of the motivations for venue selection for 
resolving specific disputes as well as the understanding of the relationship between demographic 
characteristics and venue selection. 
5.1.Recommendations for Further Research 
 
Much as the research is by large successful in answering the research questions, it does not tell us 
more about the measures being undertaken by the government of South Sudan to improve its 
justice systems. Future research should investigate this question in order to provide a clearer 
understanding of the capacity of the justice system in South Sudan and how it manages local 
disputes at the local level. In order to successfully implement judicial reforms, there is need for 
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the South Sudanese government, civil society, think tanks and research institutions in South Sudan 
to launch nationwide research to find out what people think about synchronizing legal and 
traditional laws such that one single law is applied throughout the country for dispute resolution.  
Doing so has the prospects of resolving challenges faced by disputants in their simultaneous 
utilization of modern and traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1. Questionnaire 
 
Hello respondent!  
My name is Umba Peter Bosco. I am a South Sudanese student studying Master of Arts in Conflict 
Analysis and Resolution at Sabanci University in Turkey. I am interested in knowing from you 
how you choose between/among different mechanisms of resolving problems/disputes. 
 
1. What was the most recent problem you had, for which you had to go to a higher authority to 
resolve the problem? ______________________________ (write it down) 
 
2. Which authority did you go to and resolve the problem? _____________________________ 
 
3. Which of the following reasons was essential for you to choose the authority in question 2? 
Tick in only one box to represent your answer. 
 
 Morally, religiously and culturally appropriate 
 Is affordable and accessible 
 Fairness 
 
4. Did any of the reasons below play a role for you to go to the authority in question 2? Tick 
only one to represent your answer. 
 
 Speed of resolution 
 Justice and preservation of communal harmony 
 I expect favorable settlement outcome based on past experience 
 
5. If someone you know gets into a fight with another person at the water point, who do you go 
to and resolve such a problem? Why do you say so? 
6. When a husband and a wife separates or divorces or in case of death of one of the couples, who 
do you go to and resolve issues of child ownership, care and responsibility? Why do you say 
so? 
 
  
 
7. If you get involved in a road accident, say two motorcycles collide, who do you go to and 
resolve such a problem? Why do you say so? 
 
8. In a situation where somebody borrows your money and is not willing to pay back, who do 
you go to and resolve such a problem? Why do you say so? 
 
9. If you face a problem over land, or another person forcefully takes your land, who do you go 
to and resolve this problem? Why do you say so? 
 
10. If you suspect or want to accuse someone of theft, who do you report such problem to for 
resolution? Why do you say so? 
 
11. When somebody you know becomes a victim of rape or defilement, who do you go to and 
resolve such a problem? Why do you say so? 
 
12. When somebody you know is murdered, and you are affected by it, who do you go to and 
resolve such a problem?  Why do you say so? 
 
13. When somebody you know is involved in an adultery or elopement case, who do you go to and 
resolve such a problem? Why do you say so? 
 
14. Do you remember ever going to the following people below? 
 
a. Court --------- how often -------------- why? ------------------ 
b. Chief --------- how often -------------- why? ------------------ 
c. Elders -------- how often -------------- why? ------------------ 
d. Religious leaders -----how often ------why? ------------------ 
e. Police ---------how often ---------------why? ------------------ 
 
14. DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
a. Village -------------------------- 
  
 
b. Gender ------------------------- 
c. Age/year of birth --------------- 
 
15. What is your level of education? Tick in only one box to represent your answer. 
 
 University and higher diploma  
 Some tertiary  
 Secondary school certificate   
 Some secondary school   
 Primary school certificate  
 Some primary school  
 No school  
 
16. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS 
 
a. Do you work? if yes, what is your work? 
b. What means of transport do you use? 
c. What is your main source of electricity/light in your house? 
d. What means of communication do you use? 
e. What is your main source of news? 
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